Tag: Cognitive Science

Job: “Hearing and Remembering” (Turin, Italy)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences at the University of Turin, Italy, is hiring two postdocs to work on the research project “Hearing and Remembering,” led by Elvira Di Bona. The project investigates the relationship between sound and memory, combining philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.

Applications are possible until August 31, 2026. The announcement reads:

The Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences at the University of Turin (Italy) invites applications for two 30-month Postdoctoral Fellowships in Philosophy of Mind, funded by the FIS 5-year Project “Hearing and Remembering (HeaR)” (FIS – Fondo Italiano Scienza). The project, led by Prof. Elvira Di Bona, investigates the relationship between sound and memory through an interdisciplinary approach combining philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. It examines the temporal experience of sounds (including environmental sounds, speech, and music), compares auditory and visual perception, and investigates the nature of auditory memory.

Position 1: Philosophy of Memory (BANDO 28/POST DOC)

Salary: €36,622.37 gross per year

The successful candidate should have demonstrated expertise in philosophy of memory. Responsibilities include:

  • conducting research in philosophy of memory within the analytic tradition;
  • producing at least three research publications during the fellowship;
  • teaching, in English, an introductory course in philosophy of mind;
  • contributing to the organization of public engagement, outreach and dissemination activities related to the HeaR project (https://sites.google.com/unito.it/hear/home-page).

The provisional starting date of the job is Fall 2026. Applications have to be made via the PICA online system (“Piattaforma Integrata Concorsi Atenei”, https://lavorainateneo.unito.it/details.html?id=f6f6e24b-eed4-46de-a6b2-285da1d17722).

The deadline is August 31st 2026.

Position 2: Philosophy of Perception (BANDO 27/POST DOC)

Salary: €35,174.00 gross per year

The successful candidate should have demonstrated expertise in philosophy of perception. Responsibilities include:

  • conducting research in analytic philosophy of perception on the relationship between temporal perception and auditory and/or visual perception;
  • producing at least three research publications during the fellowship;
  • contributing to teaching activities, including teaching a seminar, and undergraduate and graduate student supervision;
  • contributing to the organization of public engagement, outreach and dissemination activities related to the HeaR project (https://sites.google.com/unito.it/hear/home-page).

The provisional starting date of the job is Fall 2026. Applications have to be made via the PICA online system (“Piattaforma Integrata Concorsi Atenei”, https://lavorainateneo.unito.it/details.html?id=bf535331-c0c6-4db3-8721-7bde3653424b).

The deadline is August 31st 2026.

Both postdoctoral researchers will work closely with Prof. Elvira Di Bona, collaborate with members of the MUMBLE group, and contribute to the research activities of the HeaR project. The working language of the project is English.

Prospective candidates are welcome to contact Prof. Elvira Di Bona (elvira.dibona@unito.it) with informal questions about the research positions. Questions regarding the call or the online application procedure should be addressed to: assegniricerca@unito.it.

Talk: “The Voice that Whispers Ideas” (Aleksandr Fadeev)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On August 20 from 16:30–18:00 (UTC+2), Aleksandr Fadeev (KU Leuven) will talk about “The Voice that Whispers Ideas – Inner Speech, Semiosis, and Insight Problem Solving” in the Inner Speech Colloquium, organized by Jonida Kodra, Daniel Müller, and Mathijs Geurts (University of Osnabrück and Paris Lodron University Salzburg).

The talk can be accessed via Microsoft Teams. The abstract reads:

Inner speech, the internal silent experience of language, plays a central role in human cognition, supporting a range of cognitive processes, including thinking, memory, and self-awareness. Beyond its cognitive functions, its role in the generation and transformation of meaning remains largely underexplored. Drawing on Vygotsky’s theory and Lotman’s semiotic model of autocommunication, the talk discusses a semiotic perspective in which inner speech is understood as a dynamic process of semiosis: socially acquired signs undergo structural, functional, and semantic transformations through internalisation, thereby enabling the emergence of new and personally meaningful formations. From this broader perspective, the talk discusses how phenomenological variations in inner speech may be relevant for understanding processes of meaning transformation.

As an empirical case, we focus on insight problem solving, in which changes in problem representation and semantic restructuring are particularly important. Across a series of experiments, participants solved compound remote associate tasks (CRATs), and reported their inner speech experience after finding solutions, as well as whether solutions emerged through gradual analytical search (non-insight) or via a sudden insight (“Aha!” experience). A mixed-method approach combined open-ended reports, VISQ, semi-structured interviews, and dual-task procedures.

Findings indicate that inner speech is highly prevalent during problem solving but varies across solution types: insight solutions are associated with more condensed and less articulated forms of inner speech, whereas non-insight solutions involve more deliberate and expanded forms. These differences suggest that different modes of problem solving are associated with distinct phenomenological forms of inner speech. The study is discussed in relation to the broader semiotic view of inner speech, suggesting that phenomenological variations may contribute to understanding how meaning transformations unfold and may inform theoretical accounts of inner speech.

Job: “Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition” (Turin, Italy)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition at the University of Turin invites expressions of interest regarding applications for this year’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellowship call.

Applications are possible until September 9, 2026. The announcement reads:

The Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition (LLC) at the University of Turin invites expressions of interest from postdoctoral researchers wishing to apply for a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellowship (2026 call).

LLC is an interdisciplinary research center that brings together philosophers, logicians, linguists, psychologists, and computer scientists working on reasoning, language, and cognition. Most of its members belong to the Department of Philosophy and Education, ranked among the top 50 philosophy departments worldwide (QS World University Rankings).

We welcome proposals across the full range of the Center’s research, and especially in the following areas (potential supervisors in brackets):

A full list of faculty and their research is available at https://www.llc-philosophy.unito.it/people.

The Center currently hosts two grants that offer a particularly active environment for postdoctoral work: COST-X (ERC Starting, PI Neri Marsili), on communicative norms and online misinformation, and HeaR (FIS, PI Elvira Di Bona), on auditory perception and memory.

Interested candidates are invited to send:

  • a CV, including a list of publications;
  • the name of one or two potential supervisors among the LLC faculty;
  • a description of the proposed project (length at the candidate’s discretion; please indicate whether you intend to apply for a Global Fellowship).

Please send these materials to Luca Borgonovo (luca.borgonovo@unito.it) by 20 June 2026 (soft deadline). The official EC deadline for full proposals is 9 September 2026; we will support selected candidates throughout the process.

Summer School: “Advanced Methods in Eye Tracking”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From June 22 to 23, 2026, the summer school “Advanced Methods in Eye Tracking” will take place at the University of East Anglia, UK.

See the poster for details. The announcement reads:

This interdisciplinary summer school will offer Phd students and other early career researchers from psychology and across the cognitive and social sciences advanced training in all aspects of eye tracking, and a clear interdisciplinary understanding of a range of research questions that can be addressed by eye tracking. It will be conducted over two days, with the first day consisting of research talks and the second day consisting of hands-on lab work and skill building. The first day is being offered as a hybrid event with talks being streamed live, for students wanting to attend online only. The second day is “in person” only.

Call: “New Methods in Semantics of Artefacts”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From September 15 to 16, 2026, the conference “New Methods in Semantics of Artefacts – Meaning Beyond Linguistic Signs” will take place at the Cité de la Mode et du Design, Paris.

Abstracts can be submitted until May 25, 2026, 12:00 CEST. The call reads:

Conference details

Our organizing committee, with the support of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE–Paris Sciences Lettres) and the Institut Français de la Mode (IFM), invites submissions to the New Methods in Semantics of Artefacts: Meaning beyond linguistic signs conference, to be held on 15–16 September 2026 at the Cité de la Mode et du Design in Paris.

We are delighted to announce our invited speakers:

Philosophy: Enrico Terrone (University of Genova), Nicola Di Stefano (CNR Italy); Cognitive psychology: Charles Spence (University of Oxford); Linguistics: Philippe Schlenker (École Normale Supérieure / NYU), Pritty Patel-Grosz (University of Oslo); Musicology: Ben Curry (University of Birmingham).

Topic of the conference

Objects such as perfumes, works of art, and creations in design, gastronomy, or entertainment often give rise to mental representations that go beyond the objects themselves. Through perception and interaction, individuals attribute meanings, associations, and symbolic values to such objects, even when these meanings are not explicitly expressed in language. Understanding how such meanings emerge is a shared challenge for philosophy, linguistics, and the cognitive sciences, and this conference aims to put these complementary approaches into dialogue.

The philosophical tradition has long sought to ground what one would ordinarily call the meaning of objects in a general theory of signs – an approach exemplified, within contemporary naturalized philosophy, by Millikan’s work (Beyond concepts, 2017), as well as by more targeted theories addressing the meanings of particular kinds of objects. Pursuing the formalization of such a general theory of signs, the super-linguistics program (Schlenker, Patel-Grosz, among others) holds that formal linguistic theory can be productively extended across various domains of non-linguistic signs, drawing on notions such as the constituency (or grouping) principle central to syntax, the use of logical variables for object tracking, and the variety of inference types investigated in semantics and pragmatics. Finally, several theoretical frameworks in psychology may help address the origins of artefact meaning: in addition to the cognitive foundations of such meaning – cross-modal associations, conceptual representations, affordances, technical reasoning, and intention-based accounts – psychology can illuminate the transmission and cultural learning of the meanings that objects come to bear.

We aim to take stock of the experimental methods and conceptual tools used to study the semantics of objects, and to foster epistemological transfers from the semantics of one domain to another – music, design objects, fragrances, images, food, dance, and so forth – with particular attention to the plurality of sensory modalities through which these objects are perceived.

Submission guidelines

Each selected contributor will be invited to give a 45-minute presentation, including Q&A.

We welcome contributions that place particular emphasis on:

  • the choice and clarification of the semantic concepts employed; and/or
  • attempts at formalization; and/or
  • the originality of the empirical methods applied.

Contributions will be selected from submitted abstracts. Abstracts should be between 400 and 500 words in length, including footnotes but excluding references, and must be suitable for blind review.

The submission deadline is 25 May 2026, 12:00 noon (Paris time).

All abstracts should be submitted to: semanticsofartefacts.conference@gmail.com.

Authors will be notified of acceptance by 18 June 2026.

If your abstract is accepted for presentation, we will cover coffee breaks and lunches during the two-day conference. At present, our funding does not allow us to reimburse travel and accommodation expenses.

Call: “Measuring the Mind”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Daniela Nica and Sandra Branzaru organize a hybrid workshop on “Measuring the Mind – Conceptual Issues in Psychology, Psychiatry and Cognitive Science” that will take place at the University of Bucharest from May 29 to 30, 2026.

Submissions for contributions can be submitted until April 15, 2026. The call reads:

Psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive science increasingly rely on sophisticated measurement technologies while remaining tied to inherited assumptions about what is being measured. Many constructs – emotion, memory, attention, intelligence, disorder – are still treated as if they were stable, homogeneous, mind‑independent natural kinds with latent quantitative essences, even as empirical work reveals pervasive heterogeneity, context‑sensitivity, and replication failure across domains such as affective neuroscience, psychopathology, and social cognition. At the same time, related debates in the philosophy of biology, metaphysics, and cognitive ontology emphasize conceptual relativity and the need to re‑engineer scientific categories in light of concept‑laden evidence.

This conference asks what follows for measurement and classification if psychological and psychiatric categories are better understood as populations of variable, situated instances or relational patterns in high‑dimensional spaces, rather than as tokens of fixed types. How should we think about constructs, latent variables, and diagnostic entities if variation is ontologically primary and averages are statistical abstractions? When do our instruments partially constitute the phenomena they purport to detect? To what extent do replication “failures” reveal construct instability or ontological mismatch rather than methodological error?

We invite contributions from philosophy of psychology and psychiatry, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of biology, metaphysics and metametaphysics, as well as empirically oriented work in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience that engages these conceptual issues. Topics include, but are not limited to: cognitive and psychiatric ontology; natural kinds, homeostatic property clusters and relational or internal realism; measurement theory, psychometrics and the “quantitative imperative”; classification and re‑classification in psychiatry and cognitive science (e.g., RDoC, HiTOP); construct instability and the replication crisis; predictive processing and constructionist theories of mind and emotion; and the concept‑ladenness of evidence and data‑driven ontology re‑engineering.

Our aim is to articulate and critically assess conceptual frameworks that could underpin a “variation‑first” science of mind, in which explanation, generalization, and measurement are explicitly aligned with the heterogeneous, context‑bound phenomena they target.

The conference is organized by the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, and is open to MA and PhD students, early PhDs and postdocs, as well as established researchers in philosophy of psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, philosophy of biology, and related empirical fields.

Submission of abstracts up to 300 words is welcome via email: measuringthemind@gmail.com

  • Email subject line: “abstract submission”
  • Anonymity: Please include identifying information (name, affiliation, contact email) in the body of the email and submit an anonymized abstract as attachment.
  • Deadline for submissions: 15 April 2026
  • Notification of acceptance: on or before 10 May 2026

Date: May 29–30

Format: mixed (in‑person and online)

Contact email: measuringthemind@gmail.com

Organizers:

  • Drd. Daniela Nica
  • Drd. Sandra Branzaru

Talk: “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” (Véronique Izard)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

As part of the IHPST’s Séminaire PhilSciCog at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Véronique Izard will talk about “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” on March 26, 2026, from 15:00–16:30 (UTC+1). The hybrid session can be accessed via Zoom (Meeting ID: 950 6108 6376, Code: 535047). The abstract reads:

From the first months of life, young children can perceive numeric quantities and perform additive or multiplicative operations on quantities. These abilities support the acquisition of number concepts later in life, and have been proposed to enable humans’ arithmetic cognition. What about geometry, another major branch of mathematics? In this talk, I will present two recent studies assessing the scope and the limits of human geometric intuition. The first study focused on Euclidean geometry, and found that children and adults encode a rich repertoire of geometric properties, at several levels of abstraction. The second study probed intuitions for non-Euclidean geometry and revealed the existence of a pervasive Euclidean bias in adults, identifying limits to the flexibility of human geometric intuition.

Call: “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Organized by Andrew Sepielli, the “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory” will take place at the University of Toronto from November 7 to 8, 2026.

Submissions for contributions can be submitted until July 1, 2026. The call reads:

The workshop aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars working on questions about the relationship between empirical research on moral cognition and the foundations of moral theory. The goal is to foster interdisciplinary discussion about how empirical work in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory bears on moral judgment and the evaluation of moral beliefs.

Invited speakers include:

  • Paul Bloom (Psychology, University of Toronto / Yale University)
  • Joshua Knobe (Philosophy and Psychology, Yale University)
  • Liane Young (Psychology, Boston College)
  • Roseanna Sommers (Law and Psychology, University of Michigan)
  • Brendan de Kenessey (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

We invite submissions addressing topics at the intersection of empirical research and moral theory. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

  • experimental philosophy
  • the psychology of moral cognition
  • causal cognition and moral judgment
  • the neuroscience of moral judgment
  • evolutionary approaches to morality
  • empirical work bearing on normative ethics or metaethics
  • methodological questions about the role of empirical research in moral theory
  • debunking arguments and related challenges to moral belief

Five contributed papers will be selected. Contributed talks will consist of a 45-minute presentation followed by 45 minutes of discussion. The workshop is designed to be discussion-focused, with substantial time devoted to questions and conversation about each paper.

We welcome submissions from scholars in philosophy, psychology, law, and related disciplines. Submissions from early-career scholars are especially encouraged.

Submission Guidelines:

Please submit an abstract of 750–1000 words, along with a brief CV, to: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com 

Submissions should not be anonymized.

Important Dates:

Submission deadline: July 1, 2026

Notification of decisions: August 1, 2026

Limited support for travel and accommodation may be available.

Questions about the workshop may be directed to the conference organizer, Andrew Sepielli (Philosophy, University of Toronto), at: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com

Hot Off The Press: “Indirect Freedom”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Andrew James Latham published a book on indirect compatibilism, a new compatibilist account of free will that also takes into account experimental philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. The summary reads:

This book advances a new kind of compatibilist account of free will: indirect compatibilism. It is the first sustained philosophical analysis of the idea that the ordinary concept of free will is a conditional one.

Indirect compatibilism is the combination of two theses. The first is that the best understanding of our concept of free will is that it is a conditional concept – that indeterminism or libertarian powers are necessary if they are actual, but not if they are not. The second is indirection – that actions are free either when they are caused by standard conscious psychological processes, or else by sub-personal-level processes influenced in various ways by conscious psychological processes. The book combines traditional philosophical analysis with empirical work – in particular, experimental philosophy and cognitive neuroscience – to produce a detailed description and defence of indirect compatibilism. Indirect compatibilism resolves two important problems in the free will literature: that people as a matter of fact do not accept that free actions can exist in a deterministic universe, and that some simple actions are under the direct control of conscious psychological processes.

Indirect Freedom will appeal to researchers and graduate students interested in the metaphysics of free will, experimental philosophy, philosophy of mind, and cognitive neuroscience.

Call: “Valence Asymmetries”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Isidora Stojanovic, Lorenza D’Angelo, Morgan Moyer, and Michelle Stankovic organizing a conference on “Valence Asymmetries,” which will take place at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra from March 19 to 20, 2026.

Abstracts for presentations can be submitted until September 30. The call reads:

The Valence Asymmetries ERC team is happy to announce that it will be organizing the first VALENCE ASYMMETRIES conference on March 19th–20th 2026 at the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, Spain. The event is funded by Isidora Stojanovic’s ERC Advanced Grant “Valence Asymmetries: the positive, the negative, the good and the bad in language, mind and morality” (GA n° 101142133).

This interdisciplinary event will discuss themes which are central to the Valence Asymmetries project, including the role of valence asymmetries in perception, emotion, morality, language, and communication. Discussion will draw upon insights from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics.

There will be invited talks by Hans Alves, Frederique de Vignemont, Saif Mohammad, and Pascale Willemsen. There is also room for 4–6 additional talks, to be selected from open submissions. Each selected talk will be assigned a 50 min slot, including discussion.

We especially encourage submissions on the relation between value, valence, and polarity; theoretical and empirical accounts of valence asymmetries in language, including in negative strengthening, scalar inferences, and irony; the asymmetry between virtue and vice, and between praise and blame, in normative and applied ethics; as well as other discussions of valence asymmetries in linguistics, cognitive science, moral psychology, and cognate areas.

If you are interested in presenting your work at this venue, please submit a 2-page abstract to valence.asymmetries@upf.edu by Sep 30th, with the subject line “valence asymmetries submission.”