Month: March 2026

Talk: “Autonomous Systems, Moral Responsibility and Control Architectures” (Markus Kneer)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On March 20, from 17:00–19:00 (UTC+1), the Permanent Seminar in Analytic Philosophy (PSAP) of Università Roma Tre will host a talk by Markus Kneer about “Autonomous Systems, Moral Responsibility and Control Architectures.” The hybrid session can be accessed via Teams. The abstract reads:

Matthias (2004) and Sparrow (2007) have argued that the use of self-learning systems can engender “responsibility gaps” – situations in which nobody is morally responsible for a potential harm. In this talk, I will present empirical evidence as to whether laypeople are sensitive to such alleged “responsibility gaps” or whether their retributive dispositions might get in the way (see Danaher, 2016). I will also present new data concerning the question whether we can avoid such situations by imposing tight control architectures to ensure meaningful human control (see e.g. “human-in-the-loop v. on-the-loop,” Docherty, 2012; “tracking & tracing,” Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018).

Talk: “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” (Véronique Izard)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

As part of the IHPST’s Séminaire PhilSciCog at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Véronique Izard will talk about “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” on March 26, 2026, from 15:00–16:30 (UTC+1). The hybrid session can be accessed via Zoom (Meeting ID: 950 6108 6376, Code: 535047). The abstract reads:

From the first months of life, young children can perceive numeric quantities and perform additive or multiplicative operations on quantities. These abilities support the acquisition of number concepts later in life, and have been proposed to enable humans’ arithmetic cognition. What about geometry, another major branch of mathematics? In this talk, I will present two recent studies assessing the scope and the limits of human geometric intuition. The first study focused on Euclidean geometry, and found that children and adults encode a rich repertoire of geometric properties, at several levels of abstraction. The second study probed intuitions for non-Euclidean geometry and revealed the existence of a pervasive Euclidean bias in adults, identifying limits to the flexibility of human geometric intuition.

Call: “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Organized by Andrew Sepielli, the “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory” will take place at the University of Toronto from November 7 to 8, 2026.

Submissions for contributions can be submitted until July 1, 2026. The call reads:

The workshop aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars working on questions about the relationship between empirical research on moral cognition and the foundations of moral theory. The goal is to foster interdisciplinary discussion about how empirical work in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory bears on moral judgment and the evaluation of moral beliefs.

Invited speakers include:

  • Paul Bloom (Psychology, University of Toronto / Yale University)
  • Joshua Knobe (Philosophy and Psychology, Yale University)
  • Liane Young (Psychology, Boston College)
  • Roseanna Sommers (Law and Psychology, University of Michigan)
  • Brendan de Kenessey (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

We invite submissions addressing topics at the intersection of empirical research and moral theory. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

  • experimental philosophy
  • the psychology of moral cognition
  • causal cognition and moral judgment
  • the neuroscience of moral judgment
  • evolutionary approaches to morality
  • empirical work bearing on normative ethics or metaethics
  • methodological questions about the role of empirical research in moral theory
  • debunking arguments and related challenges to moral belief

Five contributed papers will be selected. Contributed talks will consist of a 45-minute presentation followed by 45 minutes of discussion. The workshop is designed to be discussion-focused, with substantial time devoted to questions and conversation about each paper.

We welcome submissions from scholars in philosophy, psychology, law, and related disciplines. Submissions from early-career scholars are especially encouraged.

Submission Guidelines:

Please submit an abstract of 750–1000 words, along with a brief CV, to: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com 

Submissions should not be anonymized.

Important Dates:

Submission deadline: July 1, 2026

Notification of decisions: August 1, 2026

Limited support for travel and accommodation may be available.

Questions about the workshop may be directed to the conference organizer, Andrew Sepielli (Philosophy, University of Toronto), at: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com

Call: “Folk Epistemology and Science Skepticism”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From August 10 to 14, 2026, the Cologne Summer School will take place at the University of Cologne. This year’s topic will be “Folk Epistemology and Science Skepticism,” with special guest Mikkel Gerken.

Proposals for brief presentations on Gerken’s work can be submitted until April 15, 2026. The call reads:

The Cologne Summer School is an annual, week-long, event at which leading epistemologists present their current work in a series of lectures, defend their views against critical comments, and discuss their work with participants. The Summer School mainly aims at professional philosophers and graduate students, but anyone is welcome to apply. In 2026 our special guest will be Mikkel Gerken (University of Southern Denmark).

Gerken works in epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. In Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental (Palgrave 2013), Gerken considers how externalism in philosophy of mind bears on the nature of the epistemology of inference. In On Folk Epistemology (OUP 2017), he argues that folk epistemological heuristics explain patterns of intuitive judgments that have mistakenly been taken to motivate epistemic contextualism, pragmatic encroachment, and knowledge-first epistemology. Doing so involves engagement with cognitive psychology as well as methodological considerations about the relationship between folk epistemological intuitions and epistemological theorizing. In Scientific Testimony (OUP 2022), Gerken argues that testimony is a vital part of science and articulates epistemic norms governing it. Furthermore, he considers scientific testimony to the lay public and empirically informed science communication strategies for addressing science skepticism. In addition to the monographs, Gerken has published on epistemic injustice, epistemic norms of action and assertion, transcendental arguments, the necessary a posteriori, philosophical skepticism, philosophical methodology etc.

Cologne Summer School Themes: The 2026 Summer School will address a range of issues from foundational to applied social epistemology. Many of the discussions will revolve around an important real-life problem – namely, science skepticism. For example, we will examine how science skepticism is related to varieties of philosophical skepticism. Furthermore, we will consider how folk epistemological heuristics and conversational norms may fuel public skepticism about science. We will also consider ways in which epistemologists and philosophers of science may play a role in combating science skepticism. Thus, some of the discussions overlap with issues in philosophy of science. Throughout, there will be an emphasis on philosophical methodology and epistemology’s relationship to empirical research in the social and cognitive sciences.

Topics will include

  • Philosophical skepticism and real-life (science) skepticism
  • Folk epistemology and its relation to epistemology
  • Epistemic norms of assertion and science communication
  • Internalism and externalism in epistemology and mind
  • Intuitive judgments and philosophical methodology
  • The epistemic roles of science in society

The Summer School is free but limited to 50 participants. Online application is possible through April 15. Please supply a short letter that sketches your academic background and main motivation for participating in the Summer School. If you are interested in giving a brief presentation (approx. 20 minutes) related to Gerken’s work, please also send an abstract of no more than 1,000 words.

Apply via email to:
summerschoolphilosophy@uni-koeln.de