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Author: Alexander Max Bauer

Workshop: “Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop”

Posted on October 13, 2026October 13, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

On October 14, 2026, from 16:00–18:00 (UTC+1), the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop takes place via Teams. Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin) presents on redesigning ethical thought experiments, and Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University) present on what people do and do not want to know in the moral domain. The workshop is organized by James Andow, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, and Eugen Fischer.

The announcement reads:

We are delighted to announce the October session of the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop, on Wednesday, October 14th, 16:00–18:00 (UK time), via Teams:

Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin): Redesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition.

Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (all Cornell University): What people (don’t) want to know in the moral domain.

If you would like to receive a Teams invite, please send an email with the header “Register for X-Phi workshop” to moralpsychlab@uehiro.ox.ac.uk

Organisers: James Andow (james.andow@manchester.ac.uk), Joanna Demaree-Cotton (joanna.demaree-cotton@uehiro.ox.ac.uk), and Eugen Fischer (e.fischer@uea.ac.uk)

Survey: Philosophers’ Views on Exploitation

Posted on October 5, 2026October 5, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Benjamin Ferguson, Peter Matthews, David Ronayne, and Roberto Veneziani are inviting academic philosophers to take part in a short online survey on exploitation. Participants will evaluate various abstract scenarios, and the survey takes roughly ten minutes to complete.

The announcement reads:

We are conducting a survey about academic philosophers’ views of (1) the effect of exploitation on subjective wellbeing, (2) how morally wrong exploitative relations are, and (3) norms around that wrongfulness, by asking you to evaluate various abstract scenarios.

It takes roughly 10 minutes to complete the questions, with the option to answer more if you like. If you complete the survey, we will enter you in our prize draw to receive one of ten $100 (or local currency equivalent) Amazon vouchers (unless you opt out).

Click here to take our survey (if you are using a VPN, please disconnect it before answering or we cannot use your responses):

https://esmt.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1TaQ6Qm8zeIrfuK

Thank you for contributing your expertise!

We have been granted ethical approval by review committees at our institutions.

We are Benjamin Ferguson (Warwick), Peter Matthews (Middlebury), David Ronayne (ESMT Berlin), and Roberto Veneziani (Queen Mary University London).

Call: “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy”

Posted on October 5, 2026October 5, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

In March 2027, the first “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy” will take place at the Facultad de Filosofía of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, with keynotes by María José Frápolli Sanz and James Andow.

Abstracts can be submitted until November 1, 2026. The call reads:

Submission deadline: 1 November 2026

Notification of acceptance: 15 December 2026

Conference date(s): March 2027

Workshop Venue: Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.

Details

Intuitions are a source of evidence that many people use to a greater or lesser extent. We rely on them to investigate a wide variety of issues, for example, moral, mathematical, or religious questions, or to examine other people’s opinions on a host of different topics. Although there is debate about what is an intuition, appealing to intuitions has been one of the most widely used methods in many areas within analytic philosophy. The accepted view (see Goldman, 2007; Weinberg, 2007; Williamson, 2007, p. 2; Baz, 2012, p. 87; Koopman, 2012; Kornblith, 2014) is that intuitions play a fundamental evidential role.

Besides, there has been a dispute within analytic philosophy between three different groups of philosophers during the last decades. First, the “autonomists” (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; Liao, 2008; Sosa, 2013; Chalmers, 2014; Devitt, 2015) defend that introspection and appeal to intuition can be used to answer many philosophical questions. Second, those who defend that analytic philosophers do not employ intuitions as evidence in philosophical practice. Following Nado (2016, p. 782), we can call them “intuition deniers” (see, e.g., Williamson, 2007; Deustch, 2009; Cappelen, 2012). Third, those who think that analytic philosophers use intuitions as evidence but doubt this method, arguing instead for the need to apply more rigorous methods drawn from scientific disciplines such as psychology, the social sciences, or linguistics; we can call them “experimental philosophers” (see, for example, Machery et al., 2004; Knobe and Nichols, 2007; Mallon et al., 2009; Alexander et al., 2010).

This workshop aims to include presentations addressing the relationship between intuitions and experimental philosophy. The presentations accepted are expected to develop novel perspectives or adopt novel approaches that shed light on traditional problems associated with intuitions in analytic philosophy. Both experimental and theoretical papers will be accepted, as well as explicit defenses of any of the above positions, papers that point out desiderata that all three should fulfill, or papers dealing with other issues related to intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Some possible topics that presentations may address are:

  • Intuitions and mental experiments.
  • Conflicting intuitions in questionnaires.
  • Intuitions and justification.
  • Calibration of intuitions.
  • Differences in the use of intuitions in different areas of analytic philosophy.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of the role of intuition talk in the arguments of analytic philosophers.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of philosophical practices making use of intuitions.
  • Using intuition in conceptual engineering.

Submission

Please submit an abstract including:

  • Title of the paper.
  • Abstract (400–500 words) clearly presenting the research question, theoretical framework, and main argument (in English or Spanish).
  • Institutional affiliation.

The deadline for submitting abstracts is 1 November 2026. Abstracts must be anonymized (also anonymize self-citations) and must have a section including the bibliographic references (not included in the word count). Abstracts should be sent to the following email: davbordo@ucm.es, specifying the following subject: 1st Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy.

For any questions, please write to davbordo@ucm.es.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

María José Frápolli Sanz (Universidad de Granada, Spain; Institute of Philosophy. School of Advance Study, University of London, United Kingdom).

James Andow (University of Manchester, United Kingdom).

Organizers

David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).

Martín Capece del Toro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).

Scientific Committee

Asier Arias Domínguez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Filippo Batisti (), Antonio Blanco Salgueiro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Esteban Céspedes (Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso, Chile), Antonio Duarte Calvo (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), María Dolores García Arnaldos (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw, Poland).

Job: Four-Year Postdoc on X-Phi of Memory (Bochum, Germany)

Posted on September 28, 2026September 28, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

The group of Kristina Liefke at Ruhr-University Bochum is preparing to advertise a postdoctoral position on experimental philosophy of memory. The position is expected to be formally advertised in October. The announcement reads:

My group is expecting to shortly advertise a four-year postdoc position on x-phi of memory and the continuism-discontinuism debate (conditional on a final positive funding decision in late November).

This will be a project-based 100% research position without any teaching. We expect to formally (but still conditionally) advertise the position in mid-October. The selected candidate will need to take up the position by January 2027.

If you should be interested in this position – or have students or colleagues who might be interested –, please do not hesitate to get in touch with Kristina Liefke, or to forward this message.

For more information about Kristina Liefke’s group, visit the department’s website.

Job: “Moral Psychology of Autonomy in Healthcare” (Oxford, United Kingdom)

Posted on September 28, 2026September 28, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

The Uehiro Oxford Institute at the University of Oxford is hiring a postdoctoral research fellow for the project “Moral Psychology of Autonomy in Healthcare.” Applications are possible until October 16, 2026. The job announcement reads:

Contract type

Fixed term (3 years)

Hours

Full time (37.5 / 1 FTE)

About the role

The full-time postdoctoral fellow in philosophy will conduct independent and collaborative research in the Philosophical Moral Psychology Lab under the supervision of Dr Joanna Demaree-Cotton. The post is fixed term for 3 years. The fellow will work as part of a collaborative interdisciplinary team contributing to projects within the Philosophical Moral Psychology Lab. Though they may work on various topics in the lab, the fellow’s research will include contributions to the Moral Psychology of Autonomy in Healthcare project, looking at topics such as: autonomy-based rights in healthcare; inequities in respect for medical autonomy; what it means to be ‘listened to’; whether there are moral duties of listening; cross-cultural understandings of medical autonomy and patient consent.

The lab includes researchers with complementary skills in philosophical and psychological methods respectively. The fellow will be expected to collaborate with researchers whose expertise lies in experimental moral psychology.

The fellow will be expected to actively contribute to research relevant to the Philosophical Moral Psychology Lab, and also provide guidance to junior members of the research group including research assistants, PhD students, and/or project volunteers. The Philosophical Moral Psychology Lab conducts interdisciplinary research that draws on moral philosophy, ethics, experimental philosophy and moral psychology. The lab investigates the factors and psychological processes that shape moral intuitions, moral reasoning, and moral agency, and develops empirically-informed contributions to normative debates in philosophical ethics. Current research areas include: consent and autonomy; gender bias and medical ethics; moral dilemmas; moral responsibility and blame; moral duties to the dead; animal and AI ethics. For more information about the research group, see https://moralpsychlab.web.ox.ac.uk/home.

The start date of the role is 1 January 2027 or as soon as possible thereafter, and no later than 1 October 2027.

About you

You will hold a PhD or DPhil in Philosophy (or related field), or be close to completion by the advertised closing date for this application.

It is essential for the postholder to have expertise in ethics and moral philosophy. The possession of interdisciplinary skills is desirable, and interest in relevant interdisciplinary research (e.g. psychologically-informed ethics, philosophically-informed moral psychology, experimental philosophy, and/or philosophy of psychology) is essential. The successful candidate will have demonstrated excellent research skills and willingness to work collaboratively with others.

The duties and skills required are described in further detail in the job description.

Application process

Applications for this vacancy are to be made online.

For your online application, you will be required to upload your curriculum vitae and a supporting statement. The supporting statement is to be a maximum of 3 pages in length and demonstrate that you meet each of the selection criteria for the post, using examples of your skills and experience. This may include experience gained in employment, education, or during career breaks (such as time out to care for dependents).

As part of your application you will be asked to provide details of two referees and indicate whether we can contact them now. References will only be requested for shortlisted candidates.

For further details, please refer to the How to apply section of the job description. Any further enquires about the application process may be directed to hr@humanities.ox.ac.uk. Enquiries about the role may be directed to joanna.demaree-cotton@uehiro.ox.ac.uk.

The closing date for applications is 12.00 noon on 16 October 2026. Only applications received before this time can be considered.

Shortlisting will take place by 9 Nov 2026 and interviews will be held the week of 16 Nov 2026. Interviews will be held online.

Please quote Vacancy ID 188742 on all correspondence.

Job: “EthicsLab” (Heidelberg, Germany)

Posted on September 24, 2026September 24, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Heidelberg University, Germany, is hiring a postdoctoral researcher and lab manager to set up and run the EthicsLab, a behavioural lab based at the Institute for Philosophy and the Institute for Molecular Systems Engineering and Advanced Materials.

Applications are reviewed starting November 1, 2026, and the position remains open until it is filled. The job announcement reads:

Heidelberg University is one of Europe’s leading research institutions. At the Institute for Philosophy and the Institute for Molecular Systems Engineering and Advanced Materials, we are looking for a

Post-doctoral researcher and lab manager (f/m/d)

The position

  • Conducting independent interdisciplinary research
  • Setting up and managing a behavioural lab (“EthicsLab”), which offers researchers (including yourself) the resources to conduct empirical research into questions relating to ethics
  • Teaching students in philosophy and science programmes as specified by the teaching load ordinance (LVVO), which is currently 4 hours per week (2 courses) during term time
  • Collaborating with colleagues across disciplines and institutions
  • Writing collaborative or solo grant applications
  • Contributing to administration and participating in activities at the two institutes

Your profile

  • You have a PhD in experimental philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, or a similar field
  • You conduct high-quality independent research as evidenced by publications in internationally leading journals or presses
  • You employ methods from the behavioural or cognitive sciences to conduct research into questions relating to ethics, e.g. in moral psychology, social epistemology, or applied ethics
  • You are able and keen to direct the EthicsLab
  • You collaborate with philosophers and scientists alike
  • Documented experience in teaching and supervising students in both philosophy and science is an asset
  • A successful track record of securing third-party funding is an asset

What we offer

  • A fully funded position, starting 1 April 2027 or as soon as possible thereafter. The initial appointment is limited to three years and may be extended for a further three years. Salary is in the German E13 pay range (currently ca. €66,000/year before tax, depending on experience). On top, employment includes social security and child benefits, health insurance, pension, and sick pay. The position can be shared.
  • Possibility to temporarily reduce the teaching load
  • An English-speaking academic community; German language skills are not required
  • A dynamic, collegial, and interdisciplinary working environment
  • Opportunities to supervise students, if desired
  • Opportunity for ‘Habilitation,’ if desired
  • Support programmes for early-career researchers (career coaching, mentoring, networking, etc)

To apply, please send your application in either English or German (CV, certificates, list of publications, two publications (10–30 pages each), a research statement of max one page, a teaching portfolio including a complete list of classes taught and student evaluations, contact details of three referees) in one PDF document to office-heinzelmann@uni-heidelberg.de. We begin reviewing applications on 1 November 2026 until the position has been filled (soft deadline). For questions regarding the position, please contact Alex Wiegmann at ps356@uni-heidelberg.de.

Heidelberg University is committed to equal opportunities and diversity. Qualified women are strongly encouraged to apply. Applicants with severe disabilities will be given priority in cases of equal qualification. Information on job vacancies and data protection can be found at: www.uni-heidelberg.de/stellenmarkt.

Survey: “How do we decide when to trust AI?”

Posted on September 14, 2026September 14, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Aníbal Astobiza is recruiting participants for a short online study on how people evaluate and decide whether to trust artificial intelligence. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two tasks, taking part takes up to five minutes, and all responses are anonymous.

The announcement reads:

We are recruiting participants for a short online study on how people evaluate and decide whether to trust artificial intelligence.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two complementary tasks concerning AI framing, human judgement, confidence, and responses to imperfect AI advice.

  • Duration: up to 5 minutes
  • Eligibility: adults aged 18 or over
  • Language: English
  • Format: anonymous and accessible by phone or computer
  • No camera, microphone, name, email address, or location is requested

To participate, please use this single link: https://anibalmastobiza.github.io/confiia-ai-trust-study/

Participation is voluntary, and the study may be discontinued at any time.

Please participate only once. We would also be grateful if you could share the link with potentially interested participants.

Talk: “When Do People Trust What They Are Told” (Christophe Heintz)

Posted on September 14, 2026September 14, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

On September 30 from 17:00–18:30 (UTC+2), Christophe Heintz (Central European University) will talk about “When Do People Trust What They Are Told – Studies on Epistemic Vigilance” in the Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind Seminar, organized by Sacha Behrend and Elodie Boissard. The talk can be accessed via Zoom.

The announcement reads:

We are pleased to invite you to the next session of the Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind online Seminar.

Who: Christophe Heintz (Department of cognitive science, Central European University)

When: Wednesday, September 30, from 5 pm to 6:30 pm (CET)

What: When do people trust what they are told: studies on epistemic vigilance

I will describe the mechanisms that humans have for updating their beliefs in view of what is communicated. I will argue that trusting what others have communicated is a process of belief updating that can be modelled as Bayesian. I will show that this process account for our ability to make the most of what is communicated, but also for behaviours that have been interpreted as signs of gullibility. I will then specify the challenges that our society face because assessment of trustworthiness needs to be made not just for other humans, but also for social institutions.

For any questions, please contact:
Sacha Behrend – sachabehrend1991@gmail.com
Elodie Boissard – elodie.boissard@umpv.fr

Description

This seminar series explores novel research in philosophy of mind, emphasizing “empirically informed” approaches. These approaches bridge analytic philosophy and empirical sciences such as cognitive science, neuroscience and psychiatry, providing new insights into specific mental phenomena. By combining conceptual analysis with empirical findings, these methodologies foster reciprocal contributions between philosophy and the sciences. The seminar aims to unite researchers, creating a collaborative community to showcase the dynamism of these interdisciplinary methods.

Schedule 2026

  • September 30: Christophe Heintz (Department of cognitive science, Central European University), “When do people trust what they are told: studies on epistemic vigilance”
  • October 7: Stéphane Lemaire (Université de Rennes, Centre Atlantique de philosophie), “How do moods represent future prospects?”
  • November 6: Charlotte Gauvry (King’s College London), TBA
  • December 17: Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod), TBA

Call: “Naturalizing Normativity”

Posted on September 14, 2026September 14, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

From February 4 to 5, 2027, the conference “Naturalizing Normativity – Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rules, Reasons, and Values” will take place at the Università degli Studi di Palermo, Italy. It is jointly organized by the Department of Law in Palermo and the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy. The conference aims to bring philosophers together with psychologists, neuroscientists, social scientists, and biologists.

Abstracts can be submitted until September 30, 2026. The call reads:

Call for Abstracts

DIGI & SIFA CONFERENCE ON NATURALIZING NORMATIVITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON RULES, REASONS, AND VALUES

Dates: 4–5 February 2027

Location: Università degli Studi di Palermo (Italy), Department of Law

Description

The Department of Law, Università degli Studi di Palermo (DIGI) and Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) are pleased to invite scholars to submit abstracts for the joint conference Naturalizing Normativity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rules, Reasons, and Values, to be held on 4–5 February 2027 in Palermo, hosted by the Department of Law.

In recent years, philosophers have shown growing interest in perspectives on normativity emerging from the cognitive, social, and biological sciences. This interdisciplinary turn reflects a recognition that traditional analyses of norms and values can be enriched, and perhaps challenged, by empirical insights into the psychological and biological underpinnings of normative behavior. Against this backdrop, the conference aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, social scientists, and biologists committed to genuine dialogue across disciplinary perspectives.

Topics may include (but are not limited to):

  • Normative psychology, between folk psychology and the sciences of the mind/brain
  • Normativity and biological regulation
  • Explicit vs implicit normativity
  • Naturalism and the ontology of rules
  • Psychologicy of authority
  • Psychology of formalism
  • Debunking arguments and the psychology of normativity

Confirmed Keynote Speakers to date

  • Richard Holton (University of Cambridge)
  • Joshua Shepherd (Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona)
  • Elisabeth Pacherie (Insitut Jean Nicod)

Submission Guidelines

  • Abstract length: maximum 500 words (excluding bibliography)
  • Format: PDF (anonymized)
  • Deadline: 30 September 2026
  • Language: English
  • Notification of acceptance: by 31 October 2026
  • Submission email: giuseppe.rocche@unipa.it

The accompanying email should include:

  • Full name
  • Institutional affiliation
  • Current position (and whether the PhD has been obtained)

We particularly encourage submissions from early career scholars (PhD students or scholars within five years of obtaining the PhD) and from members of groups underrepresented in philosophy and related disciplines.

Contacts: Giuseppe Rocchè (Università degli Studi di Palermo), giuseppe.rocche@unipa.it

Job: “COST-X” (Turin, Italy)

Posted on August 24, 2026August 24, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

The Department of Philosophy and Education at the University of Turin, Italy, is hiring a postdoc to work on the research project “The Epistemology of Costly Communication – Offline and Online” (COST-X), an ERC Starting Grant led by Neri Marsili. The position runs for two years and can be extended to three.

Expressions of interest are reviewed on a rolling basis. The job announcement reads:

Expressions of interest are invited for a 2-years postdoctoral position (extendable to 3) at the Department of Philosophy and Education (DFE), University of Turin, within the framework of the ERC Starting Grant project COST-X (The Epistemology of Costly Communication – Offline and Online, PI: Neri Marsili).

COST-X studies communicative norms and their epistemic import, offline and online: how communicative costs bear on the reliability of information, how speakers exploit deniability, and how these mechanisms operate in digital environments, especially on social media. The project combines philosophical work with experimental studies, which the team designs, runs and analyses.

Profile

Applications are welcome from candidates whose work fits either or both of the following profiles.

Research background:

  • philosophy of language, pragmatics, and linguistics;
  • social and applied epistemology;
  • experimental philosophy;
  • digital communication and pragmatics;
  • philosophy-adjacent profiles from related fields.

Methodological competencies:

  • experimental methods;
  • computational methods for the study of communication;
  • game theory, decision theory, agent-based modelling.

A PhD (or equivalent) in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, cognitive science, economics, or a related field is required by the starting date.

Terms

  • Duration: 2 years, extendable to 3 (subject to funding and to the applicable regulations)
  • Location: Turin, Italy
  • Working language: English
  • Expected starting date: October 2026 (TBC)

Expressions of interest

Please send a CV and a few lines on your research interests and their fit with the project to luca.borgonovo@unito.it. Informal enquiries about further details are equally welcome.

More information on COST-X: https://www.nerimarsili.com/costx.html

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Recent Posts

  • Workshop: “Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop”
  • A new R package and interactive app for computational models of causal judgment
  • Survey: Philosophers’ Views on Exploitation
  • Call: “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy”
  • Job: Four-Year Postdoc on X-Phi of Memory (Bochum, Germany)

Recent Comments

  1. Paul Henne on A new R package and interactive app for computational models of causal judgmentOctober 13, 2026

    Thank you for this contribution, Tadeg! I'm looking forward to seeing how future researchers will use this

  2. Joanna Demaree-Cotton on Where Should I Publish My X-Phi? A New ResourceApril 24, 2026

    Thanks for the comment, that's really useful. We'll definitely add AJP (missed you accidentally first time!), and that note.

  3. AJP Editor on Where Should I Publish My X-Phi? A New ResourceApril 24, 2026

    AJP is published by Taylor & Francis, and we have an member of the editorial team ('associate editor' in our…

  4. Nova Praxis on The Folk Concept of ArtJuly 11, 2025

    This article highlights an important point: everyday people don’t rely on rigid definitions to determine what qualifies as art. They’re…

  5. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 27, 2025

    That is indeed exactly the question I have as well. I operationalize it as having de facto contradicting intuitions, in…

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