Author: Alexander Max Bauer

Call: “Do Experiments Replicate?”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From September 22 to 23, 2026, the workshop “Do Experiments Replicate? Philosophical Reflections on the Use and Misuse of Statistics and Econometrics” will take place at the Jagiellonian University, Poland.

Abstract submissions are possible until June 1, 2026. The call reads:

The workshop “Do experiments replicate? Philosophical Reflections on the Use and Misuse of Statistics and Econometrics” aims to provide a forum for exchanging ideas on the replicability of randomized experiments, such as randomized field experiments in economics, randomized controlled trials and preclinical studies in medicine, and psychological experiments.

The workshop promotes philosophical and methodological discussions of conceptual and methodological issues in statistical analysis, econometric modeling, and the methodology of experimentation.

Keynote Speakers:

  • Barbara Osimani
  • Samuel Fletcher

Experimental results are considered reliable because, under comparable conditions, they are expected to yield similar outcomes. However, this assumption has recently been challenged by numerous replication efforts that report results differing from those of the original studies in psychology, medicine, biology, the social sciences, and economics. A surprisingly large fraction of published findings have been found to be non-replicable. Replicability rates range from 11% for in vitro and in vivo preclinical research to 60–90% for clinical trials. Experimental economists fall within this range and, like psychological experimenters, achieve around 60% replicability.

The replication crisis has called into question the credibility of published findings and undermined trust in science. However, the replication crisis, with few exceptions, has received only limited attention from philosophy of science. Despite the efforts of several pioneers, the philosophical and conceptual problems in randomized controlled trials, randomized field experiments, laboratory experiments, econometric modeling, and the statistical analysis of experimental data remain largely uncharted territory in the philosophy of science. The workshop aims to establish a forum for exchanging ideas among philosophers of medicine and economics, philosophers of statistics, and methodologically inclined researchers interested in the conceptual problems of the replication crisis.

The Workshop “Do experiments replicate? Philosophical Reflections on the Use and Misuse of Statistics and Econometrics” invites contributions that focus on experimentation and statistical analysis in economics and medicine, as well as problems that trouble statistical inference from experiments, broadly construed.

Some exemplary topics of talks:

  • The design of randomized experiments in medicine and economics.
  • Statistical hypothesis testing.
  • Non-frequentist approaches to comparing treatment and control group outcomes.
  • Comparisons of design-based and model-based inference.
  • Estimating statistical models.
  • Measuring replication success and replicability rates.
  • Assessing the quality of empirical evidence.
  • Making inferences from the literature review with conflicting results.
  • Other problems in philosophy of statistics related to the replication crisis.

Abstracts no longer than 500 words (including references) should be submitted in an attachment, not including author details, by email with the subject ‘replication workshop’ sent to: mariusz.maziarz@uj.edu.pl.

Deadline for submission: June 1st, 2026

Decisions will be announced by June 15th, 2026.

This activity was supported by a grant funded by the Strategic Program Excellence Initiative at the Jagiellonian University.

Talk: “Justified True Belief Revisited” (Helen Fischer)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On May 26 from 15:30–17:30 (UTC+2), Helen Fischer will talk about “Justified True Belief Revisited – A Psychological Perspective on ‘Knowledge’” at Heidelberg University. The talk can be accessed via Zoom. The abstract reads:

Modern societies rely fundamentally on the production, circulation, and recognition of reliable knowledge. Yet despite the normative and institutional prominence of knowledge, we know surprisingly little about what citizens themselves count as knowledge, to whom they attribute it, and on what grounds. A dominant philosophical account defines knowledge as Justified True Belief, requiring that a proposition be true, believed, and adequately justified. In this talk, I present a large-scale empirical test whether ordinary knowledge ascriptions adhere to this normative standard. In a preregistered conjoint experiment with a nationally quota-matched U.S. sample (N = 1,295), participants judged whether an agent “knows” propositions across a politically contested domain (climate change) and an uncontested domain (astrophysics). We fully crossed Justification (six levels varying strength and source), Truth (true vs. false), and Belief (strong vs. weak). Knowledge ascriptions systematically diverged from Justified True Belief across both domains. Belief exerted the strongest causal influence (Average causal effects: AMCE ≈ −0.42 for weak vs. strong belief), Truth was helpful but not necessary (AMCE ≈ 0.18 for true vs. false), and Justification contributed little or not at all (AMCE range across levels ≈ 0.00–0.05). This asymmetry had striking consequences: more than half of participants attributed knowledge even to false propositions when belief was strong, whereas only about one quarter attributed knowledge to true, strongly justified propositions when belief was weak. Across both domains, participants thus heavily prioritized conviction over truth and justification when judging whether others “know.” By showing that ordinary knowledge ascriptions more closely follow a model of “Strong Belief with optional Truth” than the normative account of Justified True Belief, these results help explain why low-justification and even false propositions can be treated as knowledge in public discourse.

Call: “Group Agency and Metaethics”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From September 9 to 11, 2026, the workshop “Group Agency and Metaethics” will take place at the University of Vienna.

Abstract submissions are possible until May 31, 2026. The call reads:

We invite submissions for the workshop Group Agency and Metaethics. Metaethics concerns the study of the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and psychological presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and practice. However, the answers to these various questions are typically developed with a focus on individuals. The possibility that groups are normative or moral agents in their own right is rarely considered within metaethics. The aim of this workshop is to explore the significance of the possibility of group agency for debates in metaethics, and vice versa. The workshop will focus on group agency in connection to topics such as naturalism/non-naturalism; realism/anti-realism; cognitivism/non-cognitivism; the nature of normativity and norms; normative reasons; rationality; and experimental metaethics. We further welcome submissions on related issues that may be significant for these topics. By exploring groundbreaking topics at the intersection of metaethics and social ontology, the workshop hopefully will set the stage for future debates.

The workshop will feature four keynote speakers:

  • Prof. Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)
  • Prof. Bart Streumer (University of Groningen)
  • Asst. Prof. Asya Passinsky (Central European University)
  • Prof. Hans Bernhard Schmid (University of Vienna)

The workshop will take place at the University of Vienna from 9 to 11 September 2026. If you are interested in presenting at the workshop, please send your anonymized abstract to niels.de.haan@univie.ac.at with the subject line: Abstract Group Agency and Metaethics. The anonymized abstract should be approximately 500 words. Each speaker will be allotted 1 hour (incl. Q&A). The deadline for submissions is 31 May, 2026. We aim to send out the notifications of acceptance around 15 June, 2026.

There are bursaries available for students or precariously employed participants with a lack of available funding to (partially) cover accommodation and flights. If you would like to be considered for one of the bursaries, please indicate this in the email. If your submission is successful, you will be asked to provide a short description of your funding situation to ensure we can distribute the bursaries fairly.

The workshop is sponsored by the International Social Ontology Society (https://isosonline.org/) and the University of Vienna.

Job: “Valence Asymmetries” (Barcelona, Spain)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain, is hiring two postdocs to work on the research project “Valence Asymmetries.”

Applications are possible until May 29, 2026. The job announcement reads:

There is an open call for applications, with a deadline set at 29 May 2026, for two postdoctoral researchers.

The successful candidates will conduct tasks that are transversal to the different work packages of the project. Their research will seek to understand how emotion and affect impact and underlie cognitive processes such as belief formation, decision making, conceptual representation, as well as language production and interpretation. They will work in very close collaboration with Prof. Isidora Stojanovic (project PI) and the entire team.

This is a full-time research position, without any teaching requirements, with a gross annual salary of 31.196,40 €, in a dynamic interdisciplinary team, funded by Prof. Stojanovic’s ERC Advanced grant VALENCE ASYMMETRIES GA N. 101142133.

For further details and in order to apply, consult this offer through Interfolio. The official call, specifying all legal requirement, in Catalan, can be consulted at the Deparment’s website.

Workshop: “Mental Interpretation & Mental Diversity”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From May 25 to 26, 2026, the workshop “Mental Interpretation & Mental Diversity” will take place at the University of Granada, Spain.

The announcement reads:

There is a marked tendency in the philosophy of mind to characterize mental interpretation – the understanding of each other and ourselves in terms of mental concepts, folk or sciency – in broadly universalist terms. Whether described as the exercise of psychological capacities whose basic structure is universally shared across the species (a Theory of Mind, described in functionalist-representationalist terms), or as a predictive practice based on fundamental norms of rationality, the underlying commitment remains the same: the downtown of mental interpretation is a set of universal rules, functional or rational, that set fixed boundaries to what can plausibly count as a (healthily) minded creature.

This assumption has been challenged from a number of directions. On the one hand, empirical evidence from fields like anthropology and cultural psychology points to a rich intercultural diversity in the meaning and function of mental concepts. This evidence partly converges with experimental studies on attributions of mental states like belief or intention, which reveal a marked context-dependence in the way mental attributions are used and assessed. In parallel, civil right movements like the Neurodiversity or Mad Pride movements have increasingly demanded greater recognition for intracultural cognitive diversity. This includes both subpersonal differences in sensory and executive processing, for which neurodiversity-informed research provides accumulating evidence, as well as person-level differences in how such differences are interpreted and policed in interpersonal practices.

In sum, this points to the need for a philosophy of mind better suited to accounting for this rich diversity in minds and in the ways we talk and think about them. The present workshop aims to move in this direction by bringing together cutting-edge research on mental interpretation, mental diversity, and the connections between them. The contributions address various important topics in this line of inquiry, including the analysis of consequences of different philosophical theories of mental interpretation for our understanding of mental diversity; the link between mental (self-)interpretation and the constitution of mind and mental health; inter- and intra-cultural variability in mental interpretation; mental diversity and counternormative (e.g., mad, neurodivergent) interpretation practices; epistemic and discursive injustices related to mental interpretation; or the interplay of first-, second-, and third-personal perspectives in self-interpretation.

Workshop: “Epistemologies of Places”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From June 9 to 10, 2026, the fourth workshop of the Empirical Epistemology Network will be held at the University of Stirling, UK.

The announcement reads:

This event considers how place-knowledge – especially in relation to cities – comes to be formed through sensory engagements, lived experiences, and interactions with environments through physical immersion, memory and imagination, and the role these play in giving rise to place(s). Combining academic papers with interactive activities such as storytelling, mapping, walking and artistic interventions, together we will explore the challenges and opportunities for place-based imagining and to reflect on how ways of knowing shape, and are shaped by, engagements with place.

Speakers:

  • Pablo Fernandez Velasco (Stirling)
  • Paola Di Giuseppantonio Di Franco (Durham, in-person only)
  • Rebecca Noone (Glasgow)
  • Christina Anderson (UCL)
  • Sofya Shahab (Stirling, in-person only)
  • Quill R. Kukla (Georgetown)

The overarching goal of the network is to build bridges between epistemologists and empirical researchers from various disciplines. Epistemologists will reflect about the practical relevance of their theoretical research on the nature of knowledge, and empirical researchers will consider whether some of the sharp conceptual tools of epistemologists are helpful for their own work. Participants will be drawn to identify the implicit or explicit assumptions of their work and field of research, assess whether those assumptions are warranted, and think about the consequences of challenging those assumptions. Remote participation, where feasible, is welcome. For more details about the network, up to date information about speakers and links to register, please visit https://empiricalepistemology.stir.ac.uk/index.php/events/.

Small travel and child-care bursaries available. Please note that in-person attendance is limited to 30. If you register and then realise you can’t attend, please let us know asap so that we can free the space for someone else. The Empirical Epistemology Network is run by Giacomo Melis (Stilring), Kirsten Blakey (Toronto), Jack Lyons (Glasgow) and Peter Graham (UC Riverside), and is supported by the Future Leaders Fellows Development Network (award PF 024).

The overarching goal of the network is to build bridges between epistemologists and empirical researchers from various disciplines. Epistemologists will reflect about the practical relevance of their theoretical research on the nature of knowledge, and empirical researchers will consider whether some of the sharp conceptual tools of epistemologists are helpful for their own work. Participants will be drawn to identify the implicit or explicit assumptions of their work and field of research, assess whether those assumptions are warranted, and think about the consequences of challenging those assumptions.

For more information please contact: giacomo.melis1@stir.ac.uk

Call: “Translation – Semiotics – Music”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Anna Rędzioch-Korkuz and Małgorzata Grajter edit a special issue of Studia Semiotyczne on “Translation – Semiotics – Music.”

Submissions are possible until September 30, 2026. The call reads:

Studia Semiotyczne (Semiotic Studies) invites submissions for a special issue of the journal. Papers should be written either in English or in Polish and prepared for blind review.

The field of translation and music has been attracting increased attention recently: this is evident in numerous monographs, research papers, and conferences focused on the complex relationship between words and sounds (see also Bennett, 2025: 1). As Susam-Sarajeva (2008: 189–190) has noted, this relationship appears at best challenging, since translation scholars are “more comfortable dealing with written texts,” and consequently, “end up sliding into a predominantly textual analysis.” Similarly, Desblache (2019: 58) argues that the two fields, which are genuinely interested in that relationship – namely, translation studies and musicology – remain separate because both are practice-oriented disciplines that primarily focus on either verbal translation or music.

Against this backdrop, we would like to bring the two fields together through semiotics-based research on musical texts, believing that this perspective has the potential to create resonance for general translation studies. It has been argued that semiotics is good for translation studies (Stecconi 2007; Marais 2019; Kourdis 2023), which means – at least potentially – that there is a good deal of methodological and theoretical capital that can be utilized. Research on translation and music can definitely espouse a movement away from words, verbal artefacts and textual research towards the understanding of the performative, enacted, embedded and embodied nature of meaning making within translation, i.e. towards a deeper understanding of material processes of cultural practices, which necessitate moving beyond the verbal fixation and concentrating on more semiotically-informed approaches.

In the special issue, we would like to see how the actual go-between of semiotics bridges the fields of translation studies and musicology. We encourage scholars from across the academy to explore and provide their unique insight within the suggested thematic focus of translation, music and semiotics. We welcome both conceptual and empirical research. Possible topics include, but are not limited to the following questions:

  • Can (and if yes, then how can) semiotics contribute to solving the conceptual confusion within translation studies as exemplified by translating musical texts?
  • How can translation and music capitalize theoretically on various theories of semiotics and vice versa?
  • Can we (and if yes, then how can we) apply conceptual frameworks developed by various schools, e.g. the Moscow-Tartu School of Semiotics, Paris School, Eco’s interpretative semiotics, Groupe μ, Peircean semiotics, etc. to the study of translating musical texts?
  • What methodologies can we use to research the synergy of semiotic systems in musical texts?
  • How can the concept of “textuality” be rethought when applied to musical compositions as texts to be translated?
  • How can the study of translating musical texts through semiotics help to challenge the traditional hierarchy between linguistic and non-linguistic forms of meaning-making?
  • How can semiotics challenge the literal and the human in translating musical texts?
  • How can semiotic approaches account for the performative, enacted, embedded and embodied dimensions of musical translation?
  • How can semiotics bridge the disciplinary gap between musicology and translation studies?

In order to submit the paper, one is kindly asked to submit the manuscript by sending it to: annaredzioch@uw.edu.pl, malgra@amuz.lodz.pl and studiasemiotyczne@pts.edu.pl

All submitted papers will be double-blind peer-reviewed.

Call: “Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

In March 2027, David Bordonaba-Plou and Martín Capece del Toro will host the 1st “Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy” (WIEP) at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.

Abstracts can be submitted until November 1, 2026. The call reads:

Intuitions are a source of evidence that many people use to a greater or lesser extent. We rely on them to investigate a wide variety of issues, for example, moral, mathematical, or religious questions, or to examine other people’s opinions on a host of different topics. Although there is debate about what is an intuition, appealing to intuitions has been one of the most widely used methods in many areas within analytic philosophy. The accepted view (see Goldman, 2007; Weinberg, 2007; Williamson, 2007, p. 2; Baz, 2012, p. 87; Koopman, 2012; Kornblith, 2014) is that intuitions play a fundamental evidential role.

Besides, there has been a dispute within analytic philosophy between three different groups of philosophers during the last decades. First, the “autonomists” (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; Liao, 2008; Sosa, 2013; Chalmers, 2014; Devitt, 2015) defend that introspection and appeal to intuition can be used to answer many philosophical questions. Second, those who defend that analytic philosophers do not employ intuitions as evidence in philosophical practice. Following Nado (2016, p. 782), we can call them “intuition deniers” (see, e.g., Williamson, 2007; Deustch, 2009; Cappelen, 2012). Third, those who think that analytic philosophers use intuitions as evidence but doubt this method, arguing instead for the need to apply more rigorous methods drawn from scientific disciplines such as psychology, the social sciences, or linguistics; we can call them “experimental philosophers” (see, e.g., Machery et al., 2004; Knobe and Nichols, 2007; Mallon et al., 2009; Alexander et al., 2010).

This workshop aims to include presentations addressing the relationship between intuitions and experimental philosophy. The presentations accepted are expected to develop novel perspectives or adopt novel approaches that shed light on traditional problems associated with intuitions in analytic philosophy. Both experimental and theoretical papers will be accepted, as well as explicit defenses of any of the above positions, papers that point out desiderata that all three should fulfill, or papers dealing with other issues related to intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Some possible topics that presentations may address are:

  • Intuitions and mental experiments.
  • Conflicting intuitions in questionnaires.
  • Intuitions and justification.
  • Calibration of intuitions.
  • Differences in the use of intuitions in different areas of analytic philosophy.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of the role of intuition talk in the arguments of analytic. philosophers.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of philosophical practices making use of intuitions.

Submission

Please submit an abstract including:

  • Title of the paper.
  • Abstract (400–500 words) clearly presenting the research question, theoretical framework, and main argument (in English or Spanish).
  • Institutional affiliation.

The deadline for submitting abstracts is 1 November 2026. Abstracts must be anonymized (also anonymize self-citations) and must have a section including the bibliographic references (not included in the word count). Abstracts should be sent to the following email: davbordo@ucm.es, specifying the following subject: 1st Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy.

For any questions, please write to davbordo@ucm.es.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

  • María José Frápolli Sanz (Universidad de Granada, Spain; Institute of Philosophy. School of Advance Study, University of London, United Kingdom).
  • James Andow (University of Manchester, United Kingdom).