James Andow, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, and Eugen Fischer have announced the talks for this season’s “XPHI UK Work in Progress Workshop Series.” Talks will be held on Microsoft Teams. Anyone interested in joining can email moralpsychlab@uehiro.ox.ac.uk (registration is possible until February 10, 2027). Abstracts of up to 500 words for future series can be submitted until December 15, 2026, to james.andow@manchester.ac.uk. More information is available on the PhilEvents page.
December 9, 16:00–18:00 (UTC±0)
David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) and Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw): “Mischaracterization Objection 2.0”
Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Katarzyna Kuś, Joanna Gęgotek, Monika Gurak, and Franciszek Kittel (all University of Warsaw): “From Thought Experiments to Experimental Evidence – Transparency and Quality of Reporting in Experimental Philosophy”
January 13, 16:00–18:00 (UTC±0)
Camille Lépingle (École normale supérieure de Lyon): “NARRABODY – Narrative and Body in Post-Stroke Selfhood – A Longitudinal Qualitative Study”
Konrad Henne (University of Heidelberg), Alejandra Petino Zappala (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), and Nora Heinzelmann (University of Heidelberg): “A Cross-Cultural, Qualitative Study on HPV Vaccination Intention”
February 10, 16:00–18:00 (UTC±0)
Marcus Ashby (King’s College London): “Do Subjects Have Revelation Intuitions?”
Miklós Kürthy (University of Graz), Geoffrey Goodwin (University of Pennsylvania), and Paulo Sousa (Queen’s University Belfast): “Correct, Incorrect, or Neither? Demonstrating and Explaining Variation in Folk Normative Objectivism”
Pascale Willemsen’s x-phi team at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Zurich, Switzerland, is hiring two postdocs (60–100%, 2–3 years) for the SNSF-funded research projects “Shining Light on Praise” and “The Social Power of Praise.”
Applications are possible until November 20, 2026. The job announcement reads:
I am happy to announce two Postdoctoral Research Positions (60–100%, 2–3 years) in my Xphi Team at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Zurich, starting 1 February 2027 or as soon as possible thereafter. Please share this announcement with anyone who might be interested!
The positions are part of two SNSF-funded research projects, “Shining Light on Praise” and “The Social Power of Praise,” which operate at the intersection of moral philosophy and experimental philosophy and investigate the nature, mechanisms and social impact of moral praise. “The Social Power of Praise” is a joint SNSF–FWF Weave project carried out in close collaboration with the team of Prof. Dr. Leonhard Menges at the University of Salzburg. These are pure research positions with no teaching duties.
Responsibilities
Conduct high-quality research on moral praise within the scope of the projects
Co-author and publish articles in leading international peer-reviewed journals
Contribute to the organization of conferences, workshops and project events
Collaborate closely with the teams in Zurich and Salzburg
Required
PhD in Philosophy, Psychology, Cognitive Science, Linguistics, Behavioral Economics or a related field (completed by the start date, but not necessarily at the time of application)
Demonstrated experience in empirical and/or experimental philosophy and proficiency with quantitative research methods
A publication record in international peer-reviewed journals commensurate with career stage
Strong competence in one or more of: experimental philosophy; social and moral cognition; moral philosophy (especially moral responsibility, praise and blame); philosophy of language (especially pragmatics); moral psychology; feminist philosophy (especially oppression, epistemic injustice and social norms); experimental linguistics
Fluency in English (German is not required)
Desirable
Experience with experimental paradigms such as linguistic tests, economic games, or corpus-based and computational methods
Advanced statistical skills (e.g., mixed-effects or Bayesian models in R or Python)
Commitment to open-science practices (preregistration, open data, reproducible code)
Experience in collaborative, international and interdisciplinary research
Prior research on praise, blame, moral responsibility or evaluative language
Experience in organizing academic conferences and workshops
We offer
A highly collaborative, international research environment; 100% research time; funding for travel, conferences and experimental studies; and attractive salary and employment conditions in line with the standards of the Canton of Zurich and the SNSF. The positions are based in Zurich. Successful candidates are expected to relocate to the Zurich area and to work on site at least three days per week.
Please note that the Zurich positions focus on empirical and experimental research. Applications from candidates with a purely theoretical background cannot be considered. Such candidates are warmly encouraged to contact Prof. Dr. Leonhard Menges (leonhard.menges@plus.ac.at) about the positions in Salzburg.
How to apply
Please send a single PDF containing your CV, a list of publications, up to three publications particularly relevant to the projects, and the names and contact details of two academic referees to pascale.willemsen@uzh.ch, with the subject line “Application for Postdoc PoP & PRAISE.”
The Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Seville, Spain, is offering a fully funded four-year PhD position within the research project “CONCEPHEX,” led by Hugo Viciana and Javier Anta.
Statements of interest are possible until November 30, 2026. The announcement reads:
The Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Seville invites expressions of interest for a fully funded four-year predoctoral contract within the research project CONCEPHEX, funded by the Spanish State Research Agency (AEI).
Please forward this information to anyone you think may be interested.
The project
CONCEPHEX (How Concepts Change: Experimental and Computational Approaches in Philosophy of Science and Morality), led by Hugo Viciana and Javier Anta, studies conceptual change by combining conceptual engineering, experimental philosophy, and computational corpus analysis. The project works with leading philosophers and cognitive scientists at institutions such as the Institut Jean Nicod (Paris), the University of Pittsburgh, Macquarie University (Sydney), and the University of Hong Kong. Research stays at some of these partner institutions will be encouraged during the thesis.
Possible thesis directions
The topic of the thesis is open within the broad scope of the project. Possible directions include:
Science and morality in historical perspective: studies of historical conceptual change, drawing on historical and contemporary corpora, with applications to the philosophical study of morality and science.
The moral psychology of science, including how experts and the general public understand scientific concepts.
Experimental studies of how moral concepts vary across populations, with particular emphasis on their interconnections with scientific ideas.
The moral psychology of large language models: how they represent and apply moral concepts compared with human populations, and how moral considerations shape their reasoning about scientific evidence.
Computational corpus analysis (topic models, transformer-based methods, large language models) to trace the drift of scientific concepts.
Methodological questions raised by computational methods in philosophy, such as how to operationalize philosophical orientations and how to assess what models reveal about them.
Philosophy learning and computational tools, including generative AI and digital humanities in the teaching of philosophy.
Candidates may also propose their own project within this scope. In the statement of interest, please indicate which of these directions you would be willing to work on. Interest in more than one is welcome.
What we offer
A full employment contract (not a stipend) of up to four years, with full social security coverage, including unemployment benefits. If the thesis is defended within that period, the contract may include a postdoctoral research period of up to 12 months.
A gross annual salary of at least 75% of the Spanish public-sector M3 reference category (currently around €25,450).
At least €7,000 for research expenses and doctoral tuition fees which may be complemented with additional project funds for research stays.
An increasingly international research environment, with Seville’s sunshine as an added bonus.
Research stays at partner institutions of the project, such as the Institut Jean Nicod (Paris), the University of Pittsburgh, or Macquarie University (Sydney), will be encouraged during their doctoral studies.
International Autumn Schools on research methods and several regular research seminars connected to the research topic.
Co-supervision by Hugo Viciana and Javier Anta, within the Doctoral Programme in Philosophy of the University of Seville.
Teaching. The contract includes collaboration in the department’s teaching, typically between 20 and 60 hours per year and up to a maximum of 180 hours over the whole contract, subject to university authorization. Teaching is usually in Spanish, but it can be in English under certain circumstances. Teaching may be waived in the first year when there are good reasons to do so, such as the need to develop sufficient proficiency in Spanish.
Profile
A degree and a master’s in philosophy, psychology, computer science, or related fields, or equivalent foreign degrees.
Candidates must not hold a doctorate and must not have held a predoctoral contract for more than 12 months.
Desirable:
Interest in contributing to, and helping coordinate, methodological projects on the computational study of concepts in philosophy.
English at C1 or C2 level, or equivalent.
Expertise in statistical programming, computational corpus analysis, or survey research will be particularly valued.
Timeline and how to apply
The formal application will be submitted through the University of Seville’s official call, which typically has a very short window of about ten working days.
Interested candidates should send a CV and a short statement of interest (max. 1 page) to hviciana@us.es and janta1@us.es by 30 November 2026 and preferably sooner. We will be glad to hear from candidates after this date until the official call closes. We will contact shortlisted candidates and we may help them prepare their official application, including transcripts, the grading scale for foreign degrees, and translations where needed. Non-EU candidates will need a work permit, for which the university may provide full assistance. Sending an expression of interest is not required to officially apply (but it is very strongly recommended): the official call will be open to all eligible candidates.
The University of Technology Nuremberg, Germany, is hiring five PhD and postdoctoral researchers.
Expressions of interest are possible until November 18, 2026. The job announcement reads:
The Professorship of Practical Philosophy (Ethics) at the University of Technology Nuremberg (UTN), led by Prof. Michael Klenk, invites expressions of interest for five full-time PhD and postdoctoral research positions, with anticipated starting dates between January and April 2027. We are building a research group dedicated to rigorous philosophical research on ethics, social influence, practical agency, and emerging technologies.
ERC Starting Grant: Careful, Now! (3 positions)
The project develops a new socio-technical theory of manipulation and its normative status.
1. Postdoctoral researcher: Social and Agentic Dependence ( 3 years)
AOS/AOC: Social epistemology, feminist epistemology, disability studies, relational autonomy, 4E cognition, or related areas.
2. Postdoctoral researcher: Experimental Philosophy of Manipulation (3 years)
AOS: Experimental philosophy. AOC: Ethics, social philosophy, or related fields. Expertise in advanced empirical methods and interdisciplinary collaboration is particularly welcome.
3. PhD researcher: Ethics and Politics of Manipulation (4 years)
AOS/AOC: Moral and political philosophy, particularly manipulation, autonomy, social influence, and their normative and axiological significance.
Two additional positions in Analytic Philosophy
4. Postdoctoral researcher (4 years)
5. PhD researcher (4 years)
AOS (both positions): Open. Particularly welcome are research interests complementing or extending the group’s work, including action theory, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, formal epistemology, and related areas. Research projects need not focus on manipulation. We particularly welcome applicants whose research will complement or extend the group’s broader interests in ethics, agency, social influence, and related areas.
Employment Conditions
All positions are full-time (100%) and fixed-term, with salaries according to the German public-sector collective agreement (TV-L), normally E13 (currently starting at approximately €4,760 gross per month, with higher salaries depending on recognized professional experience).
Practical Philosophy at UTN
My vision for the group is to build a team of excellent, ambitious, and intellectually curious philosophers who enjoy working together, exchanging ideas, and pursuing shared goals. I want to foster a collegial, supportive, and ambitious research culture in which everyone can develop their own research agenda while contributing to joint projects, teaching, publications, grant applications, and engagement with the wider philosophical and interdisciplinary community. Above all, I want us to do excellent philosophy and enjoy doing it together.
About UTN
UTN is a young, internationally oriented university being built from the ground up, offering a rare opportunity to help shape a new academic environment. Its interdisciplinary profile brings philosophy into close contact with computer science, AI, psychology, and other fields. The Practical Philosophy group benefits from substantial research funding, including an ERC Starting Grant, and is developing strong connections with philosophical and interdisciplinary research communities in Germany and internationally. Joining now means helping to shape the group’s intellectual direction and research culture from the beginning.
Expressions of interest – Deadline: 18 November 2026
Further information about the positions and the short expression-of-interest form:
Please use the form as the first point of contact. For additional questions not addressed there, please contact Prof. Michael Klenk at michael.klenk@utn.de.
Please note: This is a preliminary call for expressions of interest, not a formal job advertisement. Official recruitment procedures will follow.
This announcement is being circulated from a different email account due to current technical difficulties subscribing to PHILOS-L.
Christoffer Lundbak Olesen (Aarhus University), Mads Hansen (University of Bristol), and Karsten Olsen (Aarhus University) invite academics who work in or are familiar with consciousness research to take part in a preregistered study on whether differences in subjective experience shape philosophical intuitions about consciousness.
The invitation reads:
We are conducting a research study investigating academics who work in or are familiar with consciousness research. The study explores whether differences in subjective experience influence philosophical intuitions about consciousness, particularly the divide between physicalist and dualist perspectives. The study is part of an accepted Preregistered Report.
We kindly invite you to participate in this study by completing an anonymous questionnaire (approx. 30 minutes). Your participation would help to illuminate how theoretical and experiential factors relate, and whether disagreement within the field may be influenced by pre-theoretic experiential biases.
The link will take you to the website containing the survey. Here you will first be asked to provide your voluntary consent before proceeding to the study survey, which includes questions about your metaphysical views on consciousness, scenario-based thought experiments, and a set of validated psychological instruments that help us understand your experiential profile. Participation is entirely voluntary and anonymous. All data will be handled securely and in full compliance with GDPR.
We would also be very grateful if you could forward this invitation to colleagues who work on or are interested in consciousness.
The study is conducted as a collaboration between experimental researchers and philosophers at Aarhus University and the University of Bristol. If you would like to be informed when the results of the study come out, please reply with your preferred email, and you will receive a message from us.
On October 14, 2026, from 16:00–18:00 (UTC+1), the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop takes place via Teams. Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin) presents on redesigning ethical thought experiments, and Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University) present on what people do and do not want to know in the moral domain. The workshop is organized by James Andow, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, and Eugen Fischer.
The announcement reads:
We are delighted to announce the October session of the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop, on Wednesday, October 14th, 16:00–18:00 (UK time), via Teams:
Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin): Redesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition.
Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (all Cornell University): What people (don’t) want to know in the moral domain.
If you would like to receive a Teams invite, please send an email with the header “Register for X-Phi workshop” to moralpsychlab@uehiro.ox.ac.uk
In recent years, research on causation has increasingly made use of computational modeling. For example, classic questions about the causal status of omissions, the prospects of causal pluralism, or the influence of morality on causal judgment, are now being re-visited in the light of computational models of how people judged what caused an event. These models differ on the details, but at their core they assume that people make causal judgments by simulating different possible ways that things could have happened.
Unfortunately, the papers that describe the computational models can be a bit intimidating:
Not everyone has the technical background to implement a particular model from scratch on the basis of formulae like these. This means that the barrier to contributing to the new wave of research on causation inspired by computational modeling is relatively high.
I designed an R package that makes this barrier considerably lower. The package also comes with an interactive app, so you can use it even if you don’t do any R programming.
Here is an example of how you can use the app. Suppose you are interested in the causal judgments people would make about this story:
Billy and Suzy are freight train conductors. One day, they happen to approach an old two-way rail bridge from opposite directions at the same time. There are signals on either side of the bridge. Billy’s signal is red, so he is supposed to stop and wait. Suzy’s signal is green, so she is supposed to drive across immediately. Neither of them realizes that the bridge is on the verge of collapse. If they both drive their trains onto the bridge at the same time, it will collapse. Neither train is heavy enough on its own to break the bridge, but both together will be too heavy for it. Billy decides to ignore his signal and drives his train onto the bridge immediately at the same time that Suzy follows her signal and drives her train onto the bridge. Both trains move onto the bridge at the same time, and at that moment the bridge collapses.
Was it Billy’s or Suzy’s decision that caused the bridge to collapse?
It is easy to compute the predictions made by a computational model for this scenario.
Enter a description of the scenario that the app can understand. We first enter information about the ‘root variables’ whose own causes are not explicitly represented in the story. There is one variable for whether Billy decides to go, and one for whether Suzy decides to go:
For each variable, we specify a ‘sampling probability.’ This probability tells the computational model how often it should simulate the possibility where the event described by the variable happens. For instance the sampling probability of ‘Billy_goes’ is the probability that the model simulates a possibility where Billy decides to drive his train onto the bridge. Here we have specified a lower sampling probability for Billy than for Suzy, because people are biased to think of possibilities where people follow social norms, and we want the model to reflect this.
Then we define variables for the events that depend on other events defined in the story. Here we define a variable for whether the bridge collapses. We use the simple rule given in the story: the bridge collapses if Billy AND Susy drive their train onto the bridge:
The next step is to specify what happened in the actual world: Billy goes, Suzy goes, and the bridge collapses. We do that simply by toggling the value of the root variables:
Clicking on ‘compute actual world’ lets the app automatically calculate what happens to the bridge (it collapses):
Finally, we ask for causal judgments. Here you can choose which computational model you want to use. For illustration I choose the Counterfactual Effect Size model. You can also modify the value of a ‘stability’ parameter that determines to what extent the model simulates possibilities that stay close to what happened in the actual world:
Clicking ‘Compare causes’ shows the relative contribution of Billy and Suzy to the bridge collapse:
The model thinks that Billy’s decision to go is what caused the bridge to collapse. If you run the experiment, you will probably find that this is what people think too.
The power of computational models comes from their capacity to make surprising predictions. For example, you can modify the story slightly such that the bridge collapses if either Suzy OR Billy drives onto the bridge. Simply modify the rule for the ‘Collapse’ variable:
Now the model thinks that it was Suzy’s decision that caused the bridge to collapse:
If you do the experiment, you will probably find that people think this too (see Icard, Kominsky, and Knobe, 2017). So, the model helped discover a surprising fact: sometimes the decisions of people who break social norms are judged as less causal rather than more.
Once you have created a causal model of a scenario, you can save it for future use:
And that’s it!
Currently the app implements two different computational models: the Counterfactual Effect Size (CES) and the Necessity-Sufficiency model (Quillien & Lucas, 2024; Icard, Kominsky, and Knobe, 2017). There are other models of causal judgment out there, and they might be implemented in a future version.
You can read more about the R package (which powers the app) here. The app is easiest to use, but for research purposes ultimately the R package offers more flexibility. For more background on the computational models themselves you can read the relevant papers (see References).
Hopefully this tool allows more people to contribute to the new wave of research on causation inspired by computational models. If you have questions about the app or the package I’m very happy to answer them either in the comments or by email.
Literature
Icard, Thomas, Jonathan Kominsky, and Joshua Knobe (2017): “Normality and Actual Causal Strength,” Cognition 161, 80–93. (Link)
Quillien, Tadeg, and and Christopher Lucas(2024): “Counterfactuals and the Logic of Causal Selection,” Psychological Review 131 (5), 1208–1234. (Link)
Quillien, Tadeg (2026): causaljudgment: Computational Models of Causal Judgment, R package version 0.1.0. (Link)
Benjamin Ferguson, Peter Matthews, David Ronayne, and Roberto Veneziani are inviting academic philosophers to take part in a short online survey on exploitation. Participants will evaluate various abstract scenarios, and the survey takes roughly ten minutes to complete.
The announcement reads:
We are conducting a survey about academic philosophers’ views of (1) the effect of exploitation on subjective wellbeing, (2) how morally wrong exploitative relations are, and (3) norms around that wrongfulness, by asking you to evaluate various abstract scenarios.
It takes roughly 10 minutes to complete the questions, with the option to answer more if you like. If you complete the survey, we will enter you in our prize draw to receive one of ten $100 (or local currency equivalent) Amazon vouchers (unless you opt out).
Click here to take our survey (if you are using a VPN, please disconnect it before answering or we cannot use your responses):
In March 2027, the first “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy” will take place at the Facultad de Filosofía of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, with keynotes by María José Frápolli Sanz and James Andow.
Abstracts can be submitted until November 1, 2026. The call reads:
Submission deadline: 1 November 2026
Notification of acceptance: 15 December 2026
Conference date(s): March 2027
Workshop Venue: Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.
Details
Intuitions are a source of evidence that many people use to a greater or lesser extent. We rely on them to investigate a wide variety of issues, for example, moral, mathematical, or religious questions, or to examine other people’s opinions on a host of different topics. Although there is debate about what is an intuition, appealing to intuitions has been one of the most widely used methods in many areas within analytic philosophy. The accepted view (see Goldman, 2007; Weinberg, 2007; Williamson, 2007, p. 2; Baz, 2012, p. 87; Koopman, 2012; Kornblith, 2014) is that intuitions play a fundamental evidential role.
Besides, there has been a dispute within analytic philosophy between three different groups of philosophers during the last decades. First, the “autonomists” (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; Liao, 2008; Sosa, 2013; Chalmers, 2014; Devitt, 2015) defend that introspection and appeal to intuition can be used to answer many philosophical questions. Second, those who defend that analytic philosophers do not employ intuitions as evidence in philosophical practice. Following Nado (2016, p. 782), we can call them “intuition deniers” (see, e.g., Williamson, 2007; Deustch, 2009; Cappelen, 2012). Third, those who think that analytic philosophers use intuitions as evidence but doubt this method, arguing instead for the need to apply more rigorous methods drawn from scientific disciplines such as psychology, the social sciences, or linguistics; we can call them “experimental philosophers” (see, for example, Machery et al., 2004; Knobe and Nichols, 2007; Mallon et al., 2009; Alexander et al., 2010).
This workshop aims to include presentations addressing the relationship between intuitions and experimental philosophy. The presentations accepted are expected to develop novel perspectives or adopt novel approaches that shed light on traditional problems associated with intuitions in analytic philosophy. Both experimental and theoretical papers will be accepted, as well as explicit defenses of any of the above positions, papers that point out desiderata that all three should fulfill, or papers dealing with other issues related to intuitions and experimental philosophy.
Some possible topics that presentations may address are:
Intuitions and mental experiments.
Conflicting intuitions in questionnaires.
Intuitions and justification.
Calibration of intuitions.
Differences in the use of intuitions in different areas of analytic philosophy.
Empirical or theoretical analyses of the role of intuition talk in the arguments of analytic philosophers.
Empirical or theoretical analyses of philosophical practices making use of intuitions.
Using intuition in conceptual engineering.
Submission
Please submit an abstract including:
Title of the paper.
Abstract (400–500 words) clearly presenting the research question, theoretical framework, and main argument (in English or Spanish).
Institutional affiliation.
The deadline for submitting abstracts is 1 November 2026. Abstracts must be anonymized (also anonymize self-citations) and must have a section including the bibliographic references (not included in the word count). Abstracts should be sent to the following email: davbordo@ucm.es, specifying the following subject: 1st Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy.
María José Frápolli Sanz (Universidad de Granada, Spain; Institute of Philosophy. School of Advance Study, University of London, United Kingdom).
James Andow (University of Manchester, United Kingdom).
Organizers
David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).
Martín Capece del Toro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).
Scientific Committee
Asier Arias Domínguez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Filippo Batisti (), Antonio Blanco Salgueiro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Esteban Céspedes (Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso, Chile), Antonio Duarte Calvo (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), María Dolores García Arnaldos (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw, Poland).
The group of Kristina Liefke at Ruhr-University Bochum is preparing to advertise a postdoctoral position on experimental philosophy of memory. The position is expected to be formally advertised in October. The announcement reads:
My group is expecting to shortly advertise a four-year postdoc position on x-phi of memory and the continuism-discontinuism debate (conditional on a final positive funding decision in late November).
This will be a project-based 100% research position without any teaching. We expect to formally (but still conditionally) advertise the position in mid-October. The selected candidate will need to take up the position by January 2027.
If you should be interested in this position – or have students or colleagues who might be interested –, please do not hesitate to get in touch with Kristina Liefke, or to forward this message.
For more information about Kristina Liefke’s group, visit the department’s website.
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