Antonio Gaitán, Fernando Aguiar, and Hugo Viciana: “The Experimental Turn in Moral and Political Philosophy”
Part 1 – Methods and Foundations
Ivar R. Hannikainen, Brian Flanagan, and Karolina Prochownik: “The Natural Law Thesis Under Empirical Scrutiny”
Philipp Schoenegger and Ben Grodeck: “Concrete Over Abstract – Experimental Evidence of Reflective Equilibrium in Population Ethics”
Dana Kay Nelkin, Craig R. M. McKenzie, Samuel C. Rickless, and Arseny Ryazanov: “Trolley Problems Reimagined – Sensitivity to Ratio, Risk, and Comparisons”
Lieuwe Zijlstra: “The Psychology of Metaethics – Evidence For and Against Folk Moral Objectivism”
Thomas Pölzler: “The Explanatory Redundancy Challenge to Moral Properties”
Cuizhu Wang: “Belief Distributions and the Measure of Social Norms”
Mariìa Jimeìnez Buedo: “Coming Full Circle – Incentives, Reactivity, and the Experimental Turn”
Part 2 – Normative Ethics and Legal and Political Philosophy
Stefan Schubert and Lucius Caviola: “Virtues for Real-World Utilitarians”
Aurélien Allard and Florian Cova: “What Experiments Can Teach Us About Justice and Impartiality – Vindicating Experimental Political Philosophy”
Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg and Yuval Feldman: “A Behavioral Ethics Perspective on the Theory of Criminal Law and Punishment”
Douglas Husak: “Behavioral Ethics and the Extent of Responsibility”
François Jaquet: “Against Moorean Defences of Speciesism”
Part 3: Applied Issues
Blanca Rodrìguez: “Experimental Bioethics and the Case for Human Enhancement”
Norbert Paulo, Leonie Alina Möck, and Lando Kirchmair: “The Use and Abuse of Moral Preferences in the Ethics of Self-Driving Cars”
Urna Chakrabarty, Romy Feiertag, Anne-Marie McCallion, Brain McNiff, Jesse Prinz, Montaque Reynolds, Sukhvinder Shahi, Maya von Ziegesar, and Angella Yamamoto: “Adaptive Preferences – An Empirical Investigation of Feminist Perspectives”
Anastasia Chan, Marinus Ferreira, and Mark Alfano: “Reactionary Attitudes – Strawson, Twitter, and the Black Lives Matter Movement”
Literature
Viciana, Hugo, Antonio Gaitán, and Fernando Aguiar (eds.) (2023): Experiments in Moral and Political Philosophy, New York: Routledge. (Link)
This text was first published at xphiblog.com on February 28, 2019.
Discussions of moral luck usually start by presenting a pair of agents who engage in the same behavior but bring about very different outcomes. Drunk driving is the usual example. One driver – the lucky driver – arrives home without harming anyone. The second driver – the unlucky driver – hits a passerby. The question is then posed: are they equally blameworthy? Much ink has been spilled on that question (and rightly so). But an interesting issue arises even before we get there, namely, what’s going on with our attributions of luck. It seems odd to call the second driver unlucky. An accident caused by drunk driving seems to be the very opposite of a case in which a bad outcome is simply due to luck. What drives this intuition?
Philosophical accounts of luck often point to features such as lack of control, modal fragility and low probabilities as central to luck attributions. We can fill in the details in the case above in such a way as to have all three features present. And yet, it still seems unintuitive to claim that the accident was due to (bad) luck.
In a new paper, I argue that this is because the folk concept of luck is sensitive to normative considerations. In particular, it is influenced by a normative evaluation of an agent’s action and its relation to the ensuing outcome. Roughly, luck attributions are sensitive to whether the valence of the action matches the valence of the outcome. The idea is that when the valences do not match, we are more inclined to attribute luck (explaining why it seems fitting to describe the first driver as lucky, for it’s a case of bad action/good outcome). And similarly, we are less likely to attribute luck when the valences do match (e.g., bad action/bad outcome, as with the “unlucky” driver).
I tested this hypothesis across five different studies. In one study, I manipulated both the valence of the action and the valence of the outcome, and measured luck attributions. Here is an example of one vignette.
Negligent Action
About to perform a complicated procedure, a surgeon forgets to wash his hands. As a result, the chances of a failed [successful] procedure rise [drop] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the procedure fails [succeeds].
Virtuous Action
About to perform a complicated procedure, a surgeon takes special precautions, reviewing each part of the procedure carefully. As a result, the chances of a successful [failed] procedure rise [drop] to about 30%.
As a matter of fact, the procedure succeeds [fails].
Participants indicated their agreement with the following statement, “It was due to luck that the procedure failed [succeeded]” using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “disagree” to “agree”.
Here are the results:
The results followed the predicted pattern: luck attributions were highly sensitive to whether the valence of the outcome matched the valence of the action. (It’s worth saying that this effect remained significant after controlling for judgments about subjective probabilities, modal fragility, causality, and lack of control).
In a different study, the perceived valence of the action was not manipulated across conditions but rather depended on the moral views of the participants themselves. Participants read a story about a university president faced with the task of deciding whether or not to cancel an upcoming talk by a controversial speaker. The perceived valence of the president’s action, and hence the normative relation to the outcome (success or failure at creating a positive environment at the university), thus varied with individual differences in judgments about what the president should do.
Here are the results:
Luck attributions differed significantly among participants with different moral views responding to the same scenario. For example, when the president decided to let the speaker give the talk and the decision led to a good outcome, participants who disagreed with the decision judged the outcome as lucky. Those who judged the president’s action as morally right, however, did not attribute the success to luck.
It thus seems that normative considerations are an important element in our folk notion of luck. That is to say, describing the first driver as lucky already involves a normative evaluation of her action and the ensuing outcome. And our refusal to attribute luck to the second driver can be partly explained by the fact that we are not inclined to attribute luck when bad actions bring about bad outcomes.
Any thoughts you might have would be very much appreciated!
Literature
Attie-Picker, Mario (2021): “Is the Folk Concept of Luck Normative?,” Synthese 198, 1481–1515. (Link)
Members of the interdisciplinary research group “Need-Based Justice and Distribution Procedures,” funded by the German Research Foundation, have summarized the results of more than six years of research in the volume “Priority of Needs? An Informed Theory of Need-Based Justice,” edited by Bernhard Kittel and Stefan Traub. The research group’s mission statement reads:
The objective of the research group “Need-Based Justice and Distribution Procedures” is to empirically contribute to establishing a positive and informed normative theory of need-based justice. This theory should provide answers to four questions: (i) How do individuals identify their needs and which distributions are considered sufficient for those needs? (ii) On the collective level, what is considered need-based justice and which processes lead to acceptance of those needs? (iii) Which collective dynamics unfold during this acceptance process in the context of (un-)stable political compromises? (iv) Which incentive-based effects of the collective level can be observed on the individual level, and is a need-based redistribution sustainable?
Volume 5 of the “Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy,” edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, just hit the shelves! It comprises a total of 16 chapters on no less than 480 pages. See below for the table of contents.
Alexander Max Bauer and Jan Romann: “Equal Deeds, Different Needs”
John Bronsteen, Brian Leiter, Jonathan Masur, and Kevin Tobia: “The Folk Theory of Well-Being”
Shannon Brick: “Deference to Moral Testimony and (In)Authenticity”
Florian Cova: “Calibrating Measures of Folk Objectivism”
Justin Sytsma: “Resituating the Influence of Relevant Alternatives”
Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis, and Thomas Nadelhoffer: “Do People Understand Determinism? The Tracking Problem for Measuring Free Will Beliefs”
Natalja Deng, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, and James Norton: “Investing the Three Ts of Present-Bias – Telic Attitudes, Temporal Preferences and Temporal Ontology”
Blake McAllister, Ian Church, Paul Rezkalla, and Long Nguyen: “Empirical Challenges to the Evidential Problem of Evil”
Eric Mandelbaum, Jennifer Ware, and Steven Young: “The Sound of Slurs – Bad Sounds for Bad Words”
The Experimental Philosophy Society will host a session at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in New York, which takes place from January 8 to 11, 2025.
Papers or extended abstracts can be submitted until July 5. The call reads:
The Experimental Philosophy Society (XPS) will host a 3-hour session on the group program of the 2025 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, which will be held Jan. 8–11 at the Sheraton New York Times Square Hotel (811 7th Avenue 53rd Street, New York, NY 10019, USA), in midtown Manhattan.
The session will consist of three 55-minute slots (no commentators) in which researchers can present their latest work. Presentations on any topic in experimental philosophy are welcome. There is no specific theme for the session.
All presenters must register for the APA conference. Remote presentation or participation will not be possible.
Please submit your paper (preferred) or extended abstract (allowable) to James Beebe at jbeebe2@buffalo.edu by July 5, 2024.
Please do not submit a paper or abstract if you will not commit to participating, should your submission be accepted. In the past, the XPS has encountered difficulties when people see if their submission gets accepted, use the acceptance to apply for travel funding, and then decide whether they will attend only long after the deadline for making changes to the APA program.
On Monday, June 10, from 18:00–20:00 (UTC+2), Pascale Willemsen will be talking about “In Praise of Praise” at the University of Oldenburg, Germany. Pascale writes:
Philosophers claim that an agent’s moral responsibility can come in two variations: A blameworthy agent deserves blame, and a praiseworthy agent deserves praise. It is also widely accepted that a central question in moral philosophy concerns the conditions under which an agent is or is appropriately held morally responsible for their behaviour. In contrast, a central topic in moral psychology concerns the conditions under which an agent is judged to be morally responsible for their behaviour and blamed for its negative consequences. While blame and praise are seen as two sides of the same coin, considerably more attention has been paid to blame. In general, moral responsibility researchers have mainly focused on understanding negatively-valenced moral phenomena. In contrast, the positive side of moral responsibility has only played a minor role in the research programmes of moral philosophers, psychologists, and experimental philosophers. As a result, we understand relatively little about what praise is, when it is ascribed, and how it is verbally expressed. This is surprising, as researchers strive to tell a story about human morality and moral responsibility as a whole, not merely half of it.
In this talk, I will do three things: First, I summarize the relatively scarce psychological literature which strongly suggests various asymmetries between blame and praise. Second, presenting a series of my own experiments, I demonstrate that blame and praise may differ in another important respect, namely in the way it is verbally expressed by negative and positive evaluative concepts. As a result of all this evidence, I conclude that praise is a unique moral judgment that deserves closer attention. Finally, taking a first stab at the linguistic dimension of praise, I show some pilot corpus studies which explore praise vocabulary.
In our “Faces of X-Phi” series, experimental philosophers from all around the globe answer nine questions about the past, present, and future of themselves and the field. Who would you like to see here in the future? Just leave a suggestion in the comments! Today, we present Kevin Tobia.
The Past
(1) How did you get into philosophy in the first place?
It’s an unusual story. The short version is: Philosophy was a better job than DJing.
Here’s the longer version. When I was an undergraduate at Rutgers, I worked various part-time jobs, including mailroom and cleaning services for a government building, tutoring, research assistant (RA) work in a psychology lab, and DJing at college bars. Steve Stich, of Rutgers Philosophy, was recruiting an undergraduate RA to research demographic differences in philosophical intuitions. The job sounded fascinating, so I cut back on the DJing and joined Steve’s project. That turned out to be a terrific decision. At the time, I didn’t fully appreciate the world-class philosophy program at Rutgers and Steve’s brilliance and reputation. But I was hooked by experimental philosophy and fortunate to be in one of the best places to pursue it. I’m forever grateful to Steve for hiring me, mentoring me, and setting me down this path.
(2) And how did you end up doing experimental philosophy?
My entire introduction to philosophy was through experimental philosophy. In the 2010s, when I was starting, there were these little meetups (“MERG”) of experimental philosophers in the New York area. Hearing incredible philosophical discoveries from people like Josh Knobe, Jesse Prinz, Nina Strohminger, and Shaun Nichols inspired me to pursue graduate study, in Oxford on the BPhil, and later at Yale. I worked on X-Phi of various different areas: personal identity and the self, the identity of collectives (like bands), and essentialism.
Later I focused on experimental legal philosophy, or experimental jurisprudence (“X-Jur”), which formed the basis of my philosophy dissertation, Essays in Experimental Jurisprudence (2019). It’s an exciting time in “X-Jur,” with many new and fascinating studies concerning questions of general jurisprudence (e.g. what is the concept of law; are evil laws really law?) and particular jurisprudence (e.g. who is the reasonable person of tort law; how does causation in law differ from causation outside of law; does deception vitiate consent?). There are too many amazing scholars to list here, but for those interested in some of these recent discussions, I’d check out the projects of people including: Guilherme Almeida, Piotr Bystranowski, Raff Donelson, Vilius Dranseika, Brian Flanagan, Ivar Hannikainen, Felipe Jiménez (critiques), Josh Knobe, Markus Kneer, Jamie Macleod, Karolina Prochownik, Roseanna Sommers, Niek Strohmaier, and Noel Struchiner. The field has been introduced and summarized in a few places: here, here, here.
Experimental jurisprudence goes back earlier – Larry Solum noted the possibility, Tom Nadelhoffer and others have earlier legal x-phi papers, and much earlier law and psychology scholarship covers similar territory, especially related to criminal law. So the field is not new, but it has been growing especially rapidly over the past ten years.
(3) Which teachers or authors have influenced you the most on your philosophy journey – and how?
Steve Stich and Josh Knobe are two of the most influential. I was fortunate to have such brilliant and generous advisors. Larry Solan, a model of wisdom, kindness, and humility, was another major influence on my work in law and language. The ideas of all three have shaped my thinking about philosophy, law, and language. All three also share admirable commitments to interdisciplinarity, collaboration, and mentorship.
The Present
(4) Why do you consider experimental philosophy in its present form important?
Let me take one smaller part of this question: What is important about experimental jurisprudence or experimental legal philosophy?
Traditional legal philosophy regularly makes claims about how “we” all understand law and legal concepts; law is replete with concepts that resemble ordinary ones (such as cause, intent, and reasonableness); ordinary judgments directly inform law (e.g. juries deciding mixed questions); and various legal rules and theories offer empirical claims related to ordinary language or understanding (e.g. textualist judges’ interpretive claim to interpret law from the perspective of an ordinary reader). Law, legal judgments and concepts, and legal language are connected in complex ways to ordinary practices, ordinary judgments and concepts, and ordinary language. Understanding these relationships helps elucidate law itself and strikes me as a worthwhile philosophical project, which X-Jur helps advance.
For a more concrete and practical example, consider legal interpretation in the United States. An influential version of “textualism” holds that judges should interpret legal texts as they would be understood by an “ordinary reader.” To do this, judges consult dictionaries or their own intuitions about hypothetical examples. But X-Jur methods can help evaluate conclusions about this “ordinary reader.” A recent Supreme Court (dissenting) opinion cited an X-Jur study on how ordinary readers understand negated conjunctions. As far as I know, this is the first time the Court has referred to such surveys in interpretation. Justice Stephen Breyer’s recent book also draws on experimental jurisprudence research, such as Struchiner, Hannikainen, and Almeida’s findings that people’s rule violation judgments are influenced by both a rule’s text and purpose. For those interested in pursuing philosophy of law and language with concrete practical implications, the Court’s discussion of “the ordinary reader” is an area in which philosophers and experimental philosophers can make unique contributions.
(5) Do you have any critical points to make about experimental philosophy in its current state?
A critique to consider for any field is: Is the field thinking critically about its methods, including innovation and improvement? I ask that question about traditional legal philosophy in “methodology and innovation in jurisprudence.” Traditional jurisprudence and X-Jur share some methodological challenges. For example, when a legal philosopher offers an intuition to a thought experiment, does that philosopher’s intuition replicate the intuitions of others? Robert Cummins lamented that philosophers who did not share certain intuitions were not “invited to the games.” So, when traditional philosophy appeals to shared intuitions, it’s important to critically question whether those intuitions would replicate outside the seminar room.
An X-Phi variant of this concern is the “replication crisis,” which has impacted many empirical fields. In short, some empirical findings have failed to replicate when the same studies are conducted again. On that front, there have been many positive developments in X-Phi: Florian Cova led a team of experimental philosophers to attempt to replicate representative sample studies; many in X-Phi have adopted Open Science practices; there is less emphasis from X-Phi on empirical results that are “surprising.” Generally that all seems to be moving in the right direction.
(6) Which philosophical tradition, group, or individual do you think is most underrated by present-day philosophy?
Philosophy has become highly professionalized, and some today would still equate “doing philosophy” with being part of an academic program (e.g., a professor, postdoc, or enrolled student of philosophy). Of course, a professorship has not always been a requirement to philosophize, and I would love for that understanding of philosophy to return. Take the idea of “public philosophy.” Some of the most successful public philosophers today are working creatively outside of universities. ContraPoints has been enormously successful in bringing philosophy to the public and to issues of our time. Philosophy-through-law is another example. Many talented philosophers come to law school to refine their skills to pursue philosophically informed law and policy work. I would love to see a greater appreciation from academic philosophy for non-university forms of philosophizing (whether in public philosophy, entertainment, journalism, law, policy, advocacy, etc.).
This relates to a critical challenge for the discipline: the changing job prospects of philosophy graduate students. I won’t pretend to have all the answers here, but unless the academic market changes or programs take fewer students, programs should train graduate students to do philosophy through non-academic jobs.
The Future
(7) How do you think philosophy as a whole will develop in the future?
Academic philosophy’s culture has improved in recent years, and I hope this will continue. When I was a graduate student at Oxford, a decade ago, there was a sense that certain philosophical areas and questions were “deeper,” while others were superficial or peripheral – including those that took a perspectival approach, interrogated practical or applied issues, or adopted empirical methods. There were few of us in the feminist philosophy seminar and there was nothing on offer related to philosophy of race, while metaphysics and epistemology were consistently oversubscribed (these areas also used to be described as “core” philosophy). Applied legal-philosophical topics like mass incarceration were often treated as soft or non-philosophical. Things were even more extreme on the empirical front: There was even an effort from one faculty member to ban graduate students from writing experimental philosophy papers! This is obviously one ridiculous example, and there were many other wonderful and supportive faculty at Oxford, but it exemplifies the occasional extreme hostility to certain philosophical approaches that used to exist.
My sense is that in many places this has changed dramatically. Most of all, I hope philosophy will continue to develop in this direction: Welcoming (rather than shaming or banning) new or different perspectives, topics, questions, and methods strengthens the discipline.
(8) What do you wish for the future of experimental philosophy?
Much excitement around the growth of X-Phi and X-Jur came from doing something new: employing different methods, challenging old assumptions, asking fresh questions, unearthing new discoveries to inform philosophical debate. So my wish for the long term would be to find the future of (experimental) philosophy novel. The most disappointing future would be one that rehashes the same debates, in essentially the same ways, ad infinitum.
I’m optimistic about this future. The next generation of philosophers has been pursuing a broad range of questions, including philosophical questions of practical importance. The projects that I’ve advised over the past year exemplify that flourishing range of questions. One student (Zoë Moore) explored lay judgment of responsibility for using brain–computer interface (“BCI”) devices; another (Lindsay Jenkins) is studying attitudes related to technology, autonomy, and decisional privacy concerning abortion access post-Dobbs; another (Natasha Sarna) is studying judgments about privacy and the reasonableness of employer searches in the workplace; another (Nicole Steitz) is analyzing the evolving nature of “textualism” in American legal interpretation.
(9) Do you have any interesting upcoming projects?
I’m finishing a short book for Cambridge’s Elements series that introduces and defends experimental jurisprudence. And for a deeper dive, a large handbook will be released in the next year, The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence, which offers forty chapters from eighty-four scholars on a range of X-Jur topics.
Another line of projects is inspired by a common objection to experimental jurisprudence. This is the “expertise defense”: X-Jur studies should examine the judgments of legal experts, not laypeople. There is terrific philosophical debate about that question, but the expertise defense also highlights the importance of studying other populations. Eric Martínez led a recent study that surveyed American law professors about what they believe about legal theory questions. There are some interesting findings: for example, the well-known Bourget and Chalmers study finds legal positivism divisive among philosophers, but the law professor study finds positivism is more strongly supported among law professors. This empirical work doesn’t resolve the underlying philosophical debate. But it gives us new and useful material to consider, both concerning positivism and the nature of legal-philosophical expertise (it also raises new questions like: which of these two groups is the experts?).
A final line of work is inspired by another important response to X-Jur: Many studies recruit English-speaking Americans, but are the findings generalizable across other languages and cultures? (Here again, this is also an important question to ask about the intuitions offered in traditional (non-experimental) philosophy). In X-Jur there have been some efforts to address this question. Ivar Hannnikainen and collaborators tested various experimental jurisprudence findings in different languages and cultures, including findings about legal interpretation and the inner morality of law. I’m especially excited to discover more about these questions related to language, culture, and legal philosophy.
The Society for Philosophy of Causation’s second meeting will be held at the University of Göttingen, Germany, from July 19 to 21. The society’s first meeting was held last year at Kyoto University, Japan, where the society was also founded.
While the initial deadline (April 23) has already passed, I was told that submissions will still be considered. The call reads:
Encouraged are submissions on philosophy, psychology, and computer science of causation, and effort will be made to balance these topics. That is, you shouldn’t be discouraged if your submission is more on the cognitive science or computer science side of causation, the name of the society notwithstanding.
The instructions haven’t changed much. Please submit an abstract of 300–1000 words to gosation@causation.science. Specifically, please send an email with your name, the title of your talk, and the abstract in the body of the email and submission as its title. If you have a (drafty or polished) paper, or your abstract can’t be easily pasted as text (e.g., it contains figures or symbols), please in addition attach a PDF of the paper or the abstract. Please mind that the more of the argument your abstract contains, the more likely it will be accepted.
For more information about the Society for Philosophy of Causation and their conference, visit https://causation.science.
The 4th “European Experimental Philosophy Conference,” organized by Izabela Skoczeń, Tomasz Żuradzki, Piotr Bystranowski, Bartosz Janik, Maciej Próchnicki, and Vilius Dranseika, will take place from May 30 to July 2 at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland.
On May 30, there’s a pre-conference symposium on “LLMs for xPhi”. The conference program from May 31 to June 2, then, spans a total of 19 sessions and is complemented by three keynotes:
May 31, 9:30–10:45 (UTC+2)
Ivar Rodriguez Hannikainen (University of Granada): “Letter Versus Spirit – An Overview of Experimental General Jurisprudence”
June 1, 9:30–10:45 (UTC+2)
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman and her team (University of Warsaw): “Reflecting on the Knobe Effect and the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect”
June 2, 13:00–14:15 (UTC+2)
Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston): “Measuring Free Will Beliefs – What Have We Learned?”
The 32nd “Philosophy Conference” of the University of Valladolid’s Department of Philosophy, organized by José V. Hernández-Conde, will take place from May 16 to 17 in Valladolid, Spain. This year’s instalment is all about experimental philosophy.
May 16, 9:00–18:30 (UTC+2)
Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): “No Luck for Moral Luck”
María Jiménez-Buedo (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia): “What do we Measure in the Dictator Game? Constructs, Validity and the Threat of Methodological Artifacts”
Mikel Asteinza (University of the Basque Country): “Epistemic Determinants of Scientific Disclosure and Their Impact on the Legal Audience – The Case of De-Extinction”
Andrei Moldovan and Obdulia Torres (University of Salamanca): “Expertisia as a Contextual Property”
Fernando Aguiar (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas): “Would You Hire a Person With an Intellectual Disability? An Experimental Study on Action and Compassion”
Francisco Calvo (University of Murcia): “Of Seahorses and Plants – An Experimental Journey out of Ignorance”
Fernando Sanantonio (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona): “External Sanctions, Compliance and Avoidance in Vegetarianism as a Normative System”
Daniel Martín (University of Granada): “Attitudes Toward Moral Improvement Based on Virtual Assistance”
May 17, 9:15–14:00 (UTC+2)
Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): “The Geography of Wisdom”
Ivar Hannikainen (University of Granada): “What is ‘Consenting’?”
Javier Anta (University of Salamanca): “An Experimental Approach to the Ordinary Meaning of ‘Information’”
Rodrigo Díaz (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas): “Describing (Erroneously) Recalcitrant Emotions”
David Rodríguez-Arias (University of Granada): “Contemporary End-of-Life Bioethics – Empirical and Experimental Contributions”
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional
Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
