Category: Philosophy of Mind

Survey: “How do we decide when to trust AI?”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Aníbal Astobiza is recruiting participants for a short online study on how people evaluate and decide whether to trust artificial intelligence. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two tasks, taking part takes up to five minutes, and all responses are anonymous.

The announcement reads:

We are recruiting participants for a short online study on how people evaluate and decide whether to trust artificial intelligence.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two complementary tasks concerning AI framing, human judgement, confidence, and responses to imperfect AI advice.

  • Duration: up to 5 minutes
  • Eligibility: adults aged 18 or over
  • Language: English
  • Format: anonymous and accessible by phone or computer
  • No camera, microphone, name, email address, or location is requested

To participate, please use this single link: https://anibalmastobiza.github.io/confiia-ai-trust-study/

Participation is voluntary, and the study may be discontinued at any time.

Please participate only once. We would also be grateful if you could share the link with potentially interested participants.

Talk: “When Do People Trust What They Are Told” (Christophe Heintz)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On September 30 from 17:00–18:30 (UTC+2), Christophe Heintz (Central European University) will talk about “When Do People Trust What They Are Told – Studies on Epistemic Vigilance” in the Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind Seminar, organized by Sacha Behrend and Elodie Boissard. The talk can be accessed via Zoom.

The announcement reads:

We are pleased to invite you to the next session of the Empirically Informed Philosophy of Mind online Seminar.

Who: Christophe Heintz (Department of cognitive science, Central European University)

When: Wednesday, September 30, from 5 pm to 6:30 pm (CET)

What: When do people trust what they are told: studies on epistemic vigilance

I will describe the mechanisms that humans have for updating their beliefs in view of what is communicated. I will argue that trusting what others have communicated is a process of belief updating that can be modelled as Bayesian. I will show that this process account for our ability to make the most of what is communicated, but also for behaviours that have been interpreted as signs of gullibility. I will then specify the challenges that our society face because assessment of trustworthiness needs to be made not just for other humans, but also for social institutions.

For any questions, please contact:
Sacha Behrend – sachabehrend1991@gmail.com
Elodie Boissard – elodie.boissard@umpv.fr

Description

This seminar series explores novel research in philosophy of mind, emphasizing “empirically informed” approaches. These approaches bridge analytic philosophy and empirical sciences such as cognitive science, neuroscience and psychiatry, providing new insights into specific mental phenomena. By combining conceptual analysis with empirical findings, these methodologies foster reciprocal contributions between philosophy and the sciences. The seminar aims to unite researchers, creating a collaborative community to showcase the dynamism of these interdisciplinary methods.

Schedule 2026

  • September 30: Christophe Heintz (Department of cognitive science, Central European University), “When do people trust what they are told: studies on epistemic vigilance”
  • October 7: Stéphane Lemaire (Université de Rennes, Centre Atlantique de philosophie), “How do moods represent future prospects?”
  • November 6: Charlotte Gauvry (King’s College London), TBA
  • December 17: Frédérique de Vignemont (Institut Jean Nicod), TBA

Call: “Naturalizing Normativity”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From February 4 to 5, 2027, the conference “Naturalizing Normativity – Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rules, Reasons, and Values” will take place at the Università degli Studi di Palermo, Italy. It is jointly organized by the Department of Law in Palermo and the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy. The conference aims to bring philosophers together with psychologists, neuroscientists, social scientists, and biologists.

Abstracts can be submitted until September 30, 2026. The call reads:

Call for Abstracts

DIGI & SIFA CONFERENCE ON NATURALIZING NORMATIVITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON RULES, REASONS, AND VALUES

Dates: 4–5 February 2027

Location: Università degli Studi di Palermo (Italy), Department of Law

Description

The Department of Law, Università degli Studi di Palermo (DIGI) and Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA) are pleased to invite scholars to submit abstracts for the joint conference Naturalizing Normativity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rules, Reasons, and Values, to be held on 4–5 February 2027 in Palermo, hosted by the Department of Law.

In recent years, philosophers have shown growing interest in perspectives on normativity emerging from the cognitive, social, and biological sciences. This interdisciplinary turn reflects a recognition that traditional analyses of norms and values can be enriched, and perhaps challenged, by empirical insights into the psychological and biological underpinnings of normative behavior. Against this backdrop, the conference aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, social scientists, and biologists committed to genuine dialogue across disciplinary perspectives.

Topics may include (but are not limited to):

  • Normative psychology, between folk psychology and the sciences of the mind/brain
  • Normativity and biological regulation
  • Explicit vs implicit normativity
  • Naturalism and the ontology of rules
  • Psychologicy of authority
  • Psychology of formalism
  • Debunking arguments and the psychology of normativity

Confirmed Keynote Speakers to date

  • Richard Holton (University of Cambridge)
  • Joshua Shepherd (Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona)
  • Elisabeth Pacherie (Insitut Jean Nicod)

Submission Guidelines

  • Abstract length: maximum 500 words (excluding bibliography)
  • Format: PDF (anonymized)
  • Deadline: 30 September 2026
  • Language: English
  • Notification of acceptance: by 31 October 2026
  • Submission email: giuseppe.rocche@unipa.it

The accompanying email should include:

  • Full name
  • Institutional affiliation
  • Current position (and whether the PhD has been obtained)

We particularly encourage submissions from early career scholars (PhD students or scholars within five years of obtaining the PhD) and from members of groups underrepresented in philosophy and related disciplines.

Contacts: Giuseppe Rocchè (Università degli Studi di Palermo), giuseppe.rocche@unipa.it

Job: “Hearing and Remembering” (Turin, Italy)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences at the University of Turin, Italy, is hiring two postdocs to work on the research project “Hearing and Remembering,” led by Elvira Di Bona. The project investigates the relationship between sound and memory, combining philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.

Applications are possible until August 31, 2026. The announcement reads:

The Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences at the University of Turin (Italy) invites applications for two 30-month Postdoctoral Fellowships in Philosophy of Mind, funded by the FIS 5-year Project “Hearing and Remembering (HeaR)” (FIS – Fondo Italiano Scienza). The project, led by Prof. Elvira Di Bona, investigates the relationship between sound and memory through an interdisciplinary approach combining philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. It examines the temporal experience of sounds (including environmental sounds, speech, and music), compares auditory and visual perception, and investigates the nature of auditory memory.

Position 1: Philosophy of Memory (BANDO 28/POST DOC)

Salary: €36,622.37 gross per year

The successful candidate should have demonstrated expertise in philosophy of memory. Responsibilities include:

  • conducting research in philosophy of memory within the analytic tradition;
  • producing at least three research publications during the fellowship;
  • teaching, in English, an introductory course in philosophy of mind;
  • contributing to the organization of public engagement, outreach and dissemination activities related to the HeaR project (https://sites.google.com/unito.it/hear/home-page).

The provisional starting date of the job is Fall 2026. Applications have to be made via the PICA online system (“Piattaforma Integrata Concorsi Atenei”, https://lavorainateneo.unito.it/details.html?id=f6f6e24b-eed4-46de-a6b2-285da1d17722).

The deadline is August 31st 2026.

Position 2: Philosophy of Perception (BANDO 27/POST DOC)

Salary: €35,174.00 gross per year

The successful candidate should have demonstrated expertise in philosophy of perception. Responsibilities include:

  • conducting research in analytic philosophy of perception on the relationship between temporal perception and auditory and/or visual perception;
  • producing at least three research publications during the fellowship;
  • contributing to teaching activities, including teaching a seminar, and undergraduate and graduate student supervision;
  • contributing to the organization of public engagement, outreach and dissemination activities related to the HeaR project (https://sites.google.com/unito.it/hear/home-page).

The provisional starting date of the job is Fall 2026. Applications have to be made via the PICA online system (“Piattaforma Integrata Concorsi Atenei”, https://lavorainateneo.unito.it/details.html?id=bf535331-c0c6-4db3-8721-7bde3653424b).

The deadline is August 31st 2026.

Both postdoctoral researchers will work closely with Prof. Elvira Di Bona, collaborate with members of the MUMBLE group, and contribute to the research activities of the HeaR project. The working language of the project is English.

Prospective candidates are welcome to contact Prof. Elvira Di Bona (elvira.dibona@unito.it) with informal questions about the research positions. Questions regarding the call or the online application procedure should be addressed to: assegniricerca@unito.it.

Talk: “The Voice that Whispers Ideas” (Aleksandr Fadeev)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On August 20 from 16:30–18:00 (UTC+2), Aleksandr Fadeev (KU Leuven) will talk about “The Voice that Whispers Ideas – Inner Speech, Semiosis, and Insight Problem Solving” in the Inner Speech Colloquium, organized by Jonida Kodra, Daniel Müller, and Mathijs Geurts (University of Osnabrück and Paris Lodron University Salzburg).

The talk can be accessed via Microsoft Teams. The abstract reads:

Inner speech, the internal silent experience of language, plays a central role in human cognition, supporting a range of cognitive processes, including thinking, memory, and self-awareness. Beyond its cognitive functions, its role in the generation and transformation of meaning remains largely underexplored. Drawing on Vygotsky’s theory and Lotman’s semiotic model of autocommunication, the talk discusses a semiotic perspective in which inner speech is understood as a dynamic process of semiosis: socially acquired signs undergo structural, functional, and semantic transformations through internalisation, thereby enabling the emergence of new and personally meaningful formations. From this broader perspective, the talk discusses how phenomenological variations in inner speech may be relevant for understanding processes of meaning transformation.

As an empirical case, we focus on insight problem solving, in which changes in problem representation and semantic restructuring are particularly important. Across a series of experiments, participants solved compound remote associate tasks (CRATs), and reported their inner speech experience after finding solutions, as well as whether solutions emerged through gradual analytical search (non-insight) or via a sudden insight (“Aha!” experience). A mixed-method approach combined open-ended reports, VISQ, semi-structured interviews, and dual-task procedures.

Findings indicate that inner speech is highly prevalent during problem solving but varies across solution types: insight solutions are associated with more condensed and less articulated forms of inner speech, whereas non-insight solutions involve more deliberate and expanded forms. These differences suggest that different modes of problem solving are associated with distinct phenomenological forms of inner speech. The study is discussed in relation to the broader semiotic view of inner speech, suggesting that phenomenological variations may contribute to understanding how meaning transformations unfold and may inform theoretical accounts of inner speech.

Job: “Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition” (Turin, Italy)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition at the University of Turin invites expressions of interest regarding applications for this year’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellowship call.

Applications are possible until September 9, 2026. The announcement reads:

The Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition (LLC) at the University of Turin invites expressions of interest from postdoctoral researchers wishing to apply for a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellowship (2026 call).

LLC is an interdisciplinary research center that brings together philosophers, logicians, linguists, psychologists, and computer scientists working on reasoning, language, and cognition. Most of its members belong to the Department of Philosophy and Education, ranked among the top 50 philosophy departments worldwide (QS World University Rankings).

We welcome proposals across the full range of the Center’s research, and especially in the following areas (potential supervisors in brackets):

A full list of faculty and their research is available at https://www.llc-philosophy.unito.it/people.

The Center currently hosts two grants that offer a particularly active environment for postdoctoral work: COST-X (ERC Starting, PI Neri Marsili), on communicative norms and online misinformation, and HeaR (FIS, PI Elvira Di Bona), on auditory perception and memory.

Interested candidates are invited to send:

  • a CV, including a list of publications;
  • the name of one or two potential supervisors among the LLC faculty;
  • a description of the proposed project (length at the candidate’s discretion; please indicate whether you intend to apply for a Global Fellowship).

Please send these materials to Luca Borgonovo (luca.borgonovo@unito.it) by 20 June 2026 (soft deadline). The official EC deadline for full proposals is 9 September 2026; we will support selected candidates throughout the process.

Job: “Valence Asymmetries” (Barcelona, Spain)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain, is hiring two postdocs to work on the research project “Valence Asymmetries.”

Applications are possible until May 29, 2026. The job announcement reads:

There is an open call for applications, with a deadline set at 29 May 2026, for two postdoctoral researchers.

The successful candidates will conduct tasks that are transversal to the different work packages of the project. Their research will seek to understand how emotion and affect impact and underlie cognitive processes such as belief formation, decision making, conceptual representation, as well as language production and interpretation. They will work in very close collaboration with Prof. Isidora Stojanovic (project PI) and the entire team.

This is a full-time research position, without any teaching requirements, with a gross annual salary of 31.196,40 €, in a dynamic interdisciplinary team, funded by Prof. Stojanovic’s ERC Advanced grant VALENCE ASYMMETRIES GA N. 101142133.

For further details and in order to apply, consult this offer through Interfolio. The official call, specifying all legal requirement, in Catalan, can be consulted at the Deparment’s website.

Workshop: “Mental Interpretation & Mental Diversity”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

From May 25 to 26, 2026, the workshop “Mental Interpretation & Mental Diversity” will take place at the University of Granada, Spain.

The announcement reads:

There is a marked tendency in the philosophy of mind to characterize mental interpretation – the understanding of each other and ourselves in terms of mental concepts, folk or sciency – in broadly universalist terms. Whether described as the exercise of psychological capacities whose basic structure is universally shared across the species (a Theory of Mind, described in functionalist-representationalist terms), or as a predictive practice based on fundamental norms of rationality, the underlying commitment remains the same: the downtown of mental interpretation is a set of universal rules, functional or rational, that set fixed boundaries to what can plausibly count as a (healthily) minded creature.

This assumption has been challenged from a number of directions. On the one hand, empirical evidence from fields like anthropology and cultural psychology points to a rich intercultural diversity in the meaning and function of mental concepts. This evidence partly converges with experimental studies on attributions of mental states like belief or intention, which reveal a marked context-dependence in the way mental attributions are used and assessed. In parallel, civil right movements like the Neurodiversity or Mad Pride movements have increasingly demanded greater recognition for intracultural cognitive diversity. This includes both subpersonal differences in sensory and executive processing, for which neurodiversity-informed research provides accumulating evidence, as well as person-level differences in how such differences are interpreted and policed in interpersonal practices.

In sum, this points to the need for a philosophy of mind better suited to accounting for this rich diversity in minds and in the ways we talk and think about them. The present workshop aims to move in this direction by bringing together cutting-edge research on mental interpretation, mental diversity, and the connections between them. The contributions address various important topics in this line of inquiry, including the analysis of consequences of different philosophical theories of mental interpretation for our understanding of mental diversity; the link between mental (self-)interpretation and the constitution of mind and mental health; inter- and intra-cultural variability in mental interpretation; mental diversity and counternormative (e.g., mad, neurodivergent) interpretation practices; epistemic and discursive injustices related to mental interpretation; or the interplay of first-, second-, and third-personal perspectives in self-interpretation.