Category: Ethics and Morals

Job: “Collective Reflective Equilibrium for Science Translation” (Singapore)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Dean-Med-Centre for Biomedical Ethics at the National University of Singapore is looking for a research fellow specialized in quantitative methods.

The job announcement reads:

Job Description

The Centre for Biomedical Ethics (CBmE) at the Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, invites applications for a Research Fellow (Quantitative Research) position for CREST-SG (Collective Reflective Equilibrium for Science Translation – Singapore). The role is based in Singapore.

CREST-SG is a major national programme focused on empirically grounded, policy-relevant bioethics research across Healthy Longevity, Precision Medicine, Pandemics, and Artificial Intelligence, supported by a cross-cutting legal stream. The programme is led by Prof Julian Savulescu and Dr Sumytra Menon, working with Co-PIs A/P Michael Dunn, A/P Brian Earp, and Asst Prof Owen Schaefer. The successful applicant will report to A/P Brian Earp.

We are seeking an experienced and motivated postdoctoral researcher with expertise in quantitative research and ethical analysis to contribute to research, publications, and policy/practice-oriented outputs, while also supporting programme activities. This is an excellent opportunity for motivated postdoctoral researchers who are able to work independently, manage multiple workstreams, and thrive in an interdisciplinary environment.

Key responsibilities

  • Design, conduct, and analyse quantitative and mixed-methods research, including surveys and questionnaire-based studies
  • Integrate primary quantitative research data with practical ethical analysis
  • Lead the drafting of literature reviews, study materials, analysis, manuscripts, and reports
  • Prepare applications for research ethics review, amendments, and progress reporting, as required
  • Manage own research and administrative activities and coordinate multiple aspects of the work to meet internal deadlines
  • Support the organisation of workshops and meetings, including liaison with the programme administrator on logistics, communications, and event planning

Qualifications

  • PhD specialising in bioethics, or a discipline related to bioethics (e.g., philosophy, sociology, psychology); applicants holding a professional degree in medicine or law must also possess a PhD, together with formal training and demonstrated research experience in bioethics, from a reputable university
  • Strong track record in quantitative research
  • Ability to integrate empirical work with ethical, legal, or policy analysis
  • Peer-reviewed academic publications as sole or first author, relative to career stage
  • Excellent written and oral communication skills in English
  • Strong organisation and project management skills
  • Ability to work both collaboratively and independently

Contract

  • Full-time appointment commencing 1 Oct 2026
  • Initial appointment of 2 years, with the possibility of extension subject to satisfactory performance and funding availability up to 4.5 years

Application

Please submit

  • Cover letter
  • Curriculum vitae with contact details of three referees
  • One writing sample
  • Current and expected salary

Applications will be reviewed on a rolling basis until the position is filled.

Talk: “Moral Language and Moore’s Paradox” (Pascale Willemsen and Lucien Baumgartner)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On June 11 from 16:00–18:00 (UTC+1), Pascale Willemsen and Lucien Baumgartner will talk about “Moral Language and Moore’s Paradox – Challenging Moral Expressivism.” The talk can be accessed via Zoom (Meeting ID: 651 0778 6432, Code: 235823). The abstract reads:

Moore’s Paradox – e.g., “It’s raining but I don’t think it’s raining” – is widely considered infelicitous despite being logically consistent. In this paper, we extend Moore’s Paradox to moral discourse and test whether moral statements like “Murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it” elicit similar intuitions. Rooted in moral expressivism, the Parity Thesis predicts that moral assertions express non-cognitive attitudes (e.g., approval/disapproval) in a manner analogous to how descriptive statements express beliefs. In a pre-registered study with 1200 participants, we empirically test this thesis using a mixed design that manipulates moral term type (thick vs thin), evaluative polarity (positive vs negative), perspective (first vs third person), and attitude (belief vs disapproval). The results of our main study and one qualitative follow-up study suggest that while moral statements resemble Moorean Paradoxes in important ways, participants find it largely acceptable to call an action wrong without disapproving of it. As the infelicity of such statements is a core ingredient of Moorean Paradoxes and, as we suggest, the Parity Thesis, we conclude that moral language does not express approval and disapproval like declarative language expresses beliefs.

Job: “Valence Asymmetries” (Barcelona, Spain)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain, is hiring two postdocs to work on the research project “Valence Asymmetries.”

Applications are possible until May 29, 2026. The job announcement reads:

There is an open call for applications, with a deadline set at 29 May 2026, for two postdoctoral researchers.

The successful candidates will conduct tasks that are transversal to the different work packages of the project. Their research will seek to understand how emotion and affect impact and underlie cognitive processes such as belief formation, decision making, conceptual representation, as well as language production and interpretation. They will work in very close collaboration with Prof. Isidora Stojanovic (project PI) and the entire team.

This is a full-time research position, without any teaching requirements, with a gross annual salary of 31.196,40 €, in a dynamic interdisciplinary team, funded by Prof. Stojanovic’s ERC Advanced grant VALENCE ASYMMETRIES GA N. 101142133.

For further details and in order to apply, consult this offer through Interfolio. The official call, specifying all legal requirement, in Catalan, can be consulted at the Deparment’s website.

Talk: “Autonomous Systems, Moral Responsibility and Control Architectures” (Markus Kneer)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On March 20, from 17:00–19:00 (UTC+1), the Permanent Seminar in Analytic Philosophy (PSAP) of Università Roma Tre will host a talk by Markus Kneer about “Autonomous Systems, Moral Responsibility and Control Architectures.” The hybrid session can be accessed via Teams. The abstract reads:

Matthias (2004) and Sparrow (2007) have argued that the use of self-learning systems can engender “responsibility gaps” – situations in which nobody is morally responsible for a potential harm. In this talk, I will present empirical evidence as to whether laypeople are sensitive to such alleged “responsibility gaps” or whether their retributive dispositions might get in the way (see Danaher, 2016). I will also present new data concerning the question whether we can avoid such situations by imposing tight control architectures to ensure meaningful human control (see e.g. “human-in-the-loop v. on-the-loop,” Docherty, 2012; “tracking & tracing,” Santoni de Sio & van den Hoven, 2018).

Call: “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

Organized by Andrew Sepielli, the “Toronto Workshop on Moral Psychology and Moral Theory” will take place at the University of Toronto from November 7 to 8, 2026.

Submissions for contributions can be submitted until July 1, 2026. The call reads:

The workshop aims to bring together philosophers, psychologists, and legal scholars working on questions about the relationship between empirical research on moral cognition and the foundations of moral theory. The goal is to foster interdisciplinary discussion about how empirical work in fields such as psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory bears on moral judgment and the evaluation of moral beliefs.

Invited speakers include:

  • Paul Bloom (Psychology, University of Toronto / Yale University)
  • Joshua Knobe (Philosophy and Psychology, Yale University)
  • Liane Young (Psychology, Boston College)
  • Roseanna Sommers (Law and Psychology, University of Michigan)
  • Brendan de Kenessey (Philosophy, University of Toronto)

We invite submissions addressing topics at the intersection of empirical research and moral theory. Relevant topics include, but are not limited to:

  • experimental philosophy
  • the psychology of moral cognition
  • causal cognition and moral judgment
  • the neuroscience of moral judgment
  • evolutionary approaches to morality
  • empirical work bearing on normative ethics or metaethics
  • methodological questions about the role of empirical research in moral theory
  • debunking arguments and related challenges to moral belief

Five contributed papers will be selected. Contributed talks will consist of a 45-minute presentation followed by 45 minutes of discussion. The workshop is designed to be discussion-focused, with substantial time devoted to questions and conversation about each paper.

We welcome submissions from scholars in philosophy, psychology, law, and related disciplines. Submissions from early-career scholars are especially encouraged.

Submission Guidelines:

Please submit an abstract of 750–1000 words, along with a brief CV, to: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com 

Submissions should not be anonymized.

Important Dates:

Submission deadline: July 1, 2026

Notification of decisions: August 1, 2026

Limited support for travel and accommodation may be available.

Questions about the workshop may be directed to the conference organizer, Andrew Sepielli (Philosophy, University of Toronto), at: torontomoralpsych@gmail.com

Call: “Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Linguistic Justice”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

On September 8, 2026, the satellite workshop “Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Linguistic Justice” will accompany the 6th European Experimental Philosophy Conference at the University of Cagliari, Italy.

Proposals for talks can be submitted until May 1, 2026. The call reads:

The Conference will be accompanied by a Satellite Workshop on “Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Linguistic Justice” (IPLJ), to be held on 8 September 2026. The IPLJ Workshop will be held in collaboration with the Linguistic Justice Society (LJS). The IPLJ Workshop welcomes experimental and empirically informed contributions on linguistic justice broadly construed, to include linguistic diversity, accent bias and related topics. For the Workshop, we welcome only contributions in the form of talks. There will be no fees for those wishing to take part in the IPLJ Satellite Workshop, which will also be online-accessible.

Deadline: May 1st, 2026

https://openreview.net/group?id=EXPhi/2026/Conference/Workshop/IPLJ

Decisions expected by June 1st, 2026

Submitting authors will have or create a profile on OpenReview. Whereas new profiles with an institutional email will be activated automatically, new profiles created without an institutional email will go through a moderation process that can take up to two weeks. Abstracts for talks should be anonymized for review and not exceed 500 words. References and figure captions do not count towards the word limit. Please make sure all materials for review are anonymized.

Talk: “Normality and Norms” (Josh Knobe)

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

The Center for Philosophy and the Health Sciences at Aarhus University is hosting a lecture by Joshua Knobe. It will take place on Thursday, January 29, 15:15–16:45 (UTC+1) via Zoom. The abstract reads:

The notion of normality plays a role in the way people understand many different scientifically important concepts. For example, normality figures in people’s understanding of what it is for a trait to be innate, what it is for one event to cause another, and what it is for the state to count as a disease. I will be presenting a theory about ordinary attributions of normality and then exploring the application of this theory to all three of these types of judgments. The theory is that ordinary attributions of normality involve a mixture of statistical judgments (how frequent something is) and evaluative judgments (how good something is). Thus, the key claim is that both statistical and evaluative judgments play a role in people’s ordinary understanding of innateness, causation and disease.

Hot Off The Press: “The Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts”

Posted on by Alexander Max Bauer

In “The Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts,” Matt Lindauer argues for a strong connection between philosophical theory and its real-world applicability, also drawing on moral psychology and adjacent fields. The book’s summary reads:

Can philosophical concepts do real work in improving our world? Should we, when evaluating competing understandings of concepts like “justice,” “empowerment,” and “solidarity,” take into account whether these different understandings can actually help us to fight injustice, empower the oppressed, and promote solidarity between people? The Fruitfulness of Normative Concepts is the first book-length attempt to argue that the answer to both of these questions is an emphatic “yes.” In doing so, it provides a bold new defense of a tight relationship between philosophical theory and practice. The book advances the view that moral and political philosophers should be interested in the “fruitfulness” of normative concepts – how well they help us to solve practical problems that we inevitably face as human beings interacting with one another. This view has broad implications for a number of important contemporary philosophical debates that the book examines, including debates over the nature of moral motivation, the duties of the global affluent to the global poor, the nature of justice in diverse multicultural societies, ideal versus non-ideal theory in political philosophy, and conceptual engineering. Drawing on cutting-edge research in moral psychology and adjacent fields, the book also demonstrates that we now have the scientific tools to concretely evaluate the practical value of moral and political concepts. It issues an important call to continue developing the use of these tools and methods to produce more philosophically and scientifically significant work on the distinctive value of normative thought and practice.