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Month: October 2026

Survey: “Dualist And Physicalist Minds”

Posted on October 23, 2026October 23, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Christoffer Lundbak Olesen (Aarhus University), Mads Hansen (University of Bristol), and Karsten Olsen (Aarhus University) invite academics who work in or are familiar with consciousness research to take part in a preregistered study on whether differences in subjective experience shape philosophical intuitions about consciousness.

The invitation reads:

We are conducting a research study investigating academics who work in or are familiar with consciousness research. The study explores whether differences in subjective experience influence philosophical intuitions about consciousness, particularly the divide between physicalist and dualist perspectives. The study is part of an accepted Preregistered Report.

We kindly invite you to participate in this study by completing an anonymous questionnaire (approx. 30 minutes). Your participation would help to illuminate how theoretical and experiential factors relate, and whether disagreement within the field may be influenced by pre-theoretic experiential biases.

Read more about the study and access the survey here: https://survey.au.dk/LinkCollector?key=81KSG25CS136

Or visit the Aarhus University survey website https://survey.au.dk/collect and type in the code: 81KS-G25C-S136

The link will take you to the website containing the survey. Here you will first be asked to provide your voluntary consent before proceeding to the study survey, which includes questions about your metaphysical views on consciousness, scenario-based thought experiments, and a set of validated psychological instruments that help us understand your experiential profile. Participation is entirely voluntary and anonymous. All data will be handled securely and in full compliance with GDPR.

We would also be very grateful if you could forward this invitation to colleagues who work on or are interested in consciousness.

The study is conducted as a collaboration between experimental researchers and philosophers at Aarhus University and the University of Bristol. If you would like to be informed when the results of the study come out, please reply with your preferred email, and you will receive a message from us.

Workshop: “Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop”

Posted on October 13, 2026October 13, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

On October 14, 2026, from 16:00–18:00 (UTC+1), the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop takes place via Teams. Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin) presents on redesigning ethical thought experiments, and Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (Cornell University) present on what people do and do not want to know in the moral domain. The workshop is organized by James Andow, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, and Eugen Fischer.

The announcement reads:

We are delighted to announce the October session of the Experimental Philosophy Online Work-in-Progress Workshop, on Wednesday, October 14th, 16:00–18:00 (UK time), via Teams:

Pietro Tunesi (Trinity College Dublin): Redesigning Ethical Thought Experiments: Reassessing the Experimental Challenge to Moral Intuition.

Jordan Wylie, Nathan Liang, and Charlotte Austin (all Cornell University): What people (don’t) want to know in the moral domain.

If you would like to receive a Teams invite, please send an email with the header “Register for X-Phi workshop” to moralpsychlab@uehiro.ox.ac.uk

Organisers: James Andow (james.andow@manchester.ac.uk), Joanna Demaree-Cotton (joanna.demaree-cotton@uehiro.ox.ac.uk), and Eugen Fischer (e.fischer@uea.ac.uk)

A New R Package and Interactive App for Computational Models of Causal Judgment

Posted on October 10, 2026October 16, 2026 by Tadeg Quillien

In recent years, research on causation has increasingly made use of computational modeling. For example, classic questions about the causal status of omissions, the prospects of causal pluralism, or the influence of morality on causal judgment, are now being re-visited in the light of computational models of how people judged what caused an event. These models differ on the details, but at their core they assume that people make causal judgments by simulating different possible ways that things could have happened.

Unfortunately, the papers that describe the computational models can be a bit intimidating:

Not everyone has the technical background to implement a particular model from scratch on the basis of formulae like these. This means that the barrier to contributing to the new wave of research on causation inspired by computational modeling is relatively high.

I designed an R package that makes this barrier considerably lower. The package also comes with an interactive app, so you can use it even if you don’t do any R programming.

Here is an example of how you can use the app. Suppose you are interested in the causal judgments people would make about this story:

Billy and Suzy are freight train conductors. One day, they happen to approach an old two-way rail bridge from opposite directions at the same time. There are signals on either side of the bridge. Billy’s signal is red, so he is supposed to stop and wait. Suzy’s signal is green, so she is supposed to drive across immediately. Neither of them realizes that the bridge is on the verge of collapse. If they both drive their trains onto the bridge at the same time, it will collapse. Neither train is heavy enough on its own to break the bridge, but both together will be too heavy for it. Billy decides to ignore his signal and drives his train onto the bridge immediately at the same time that Suzy follows her signal and drives her train onto the bridge. Both trains move onto the bridge at the same time, and at that moment the bridge collapses.

Was it Billy’s or Suzy’s decision that caused the bridge to collapse?

It is easy to compute the predictions made by a computational model for this scenario.

  • Enter a description of the scenario that the app can understand. We first enter information about the ‘root variables’ whose own causes are not explicitly represented in the story. There is one variable for whether Billy decides to go, and one for whether Suzy decides to go:

For each variable, we specify a ‘sampling probability.’ This probability tells the computational model how often it should simulate the possibility where the event described by the variable happens. For instance the sampling probability of ‘Billy_goes’ is the probability that the model simulates a possibility where Billy decides to drive his train onto the bridge. Here we have specified a lower sampling probability for Billy than for Suzy, because people are biased to think of possibilities where people follow social norms, and we want the model to reflect this.

Then we define variables for the events that depend on other events defined in the story. Here we define a variable for whether the bridge collapses. We use the simple rule given in the story: the bridge collapses if Billy AND Susy drive their train onto the bridge:

  • The next step is to specify what happened in the actual world: Billy goes, Suzy goes, and the bridge collapses. We do that simply by toggling the value of the root variables:

Clicking on ‘compute actual world’ lets the app automatically calculate what happens to the bridge (it collapses):

  • Finally, we ask for causal judgments. Here you can choose which computational model you want to use. For illustration I choose the Counterfactual Effect Size model. You can also modify the value of a ‘stability’ parameter that determines to what extent the model simulates possibilities that stay close to what happened in the actual world:

Clicking ‘Compare causes’ shows the relative contribution of Billy and Suzy to the bridge collapse:

The model thinks that Billy’s decision to go is what caused the bridge to collapse. If you run the experiment, you will probably find that this is what people think too.

The power of computational models comes from their capacity to make surprising predictions. For example, you can modify the story slightly such that the bridge collapses if either Suzy OR Billy drives onto the bridge. Simply modify the rule for the ‘Collapse’ variable:

Now the model thinks that it was Suzy’s decision that caused the bridge to collapse:

If you do the experiment, you will probably find that people think this too (see Icard, Kominsky, and Knobe, 2017). So, the model helped discover a surprising fact: sometimes the decisions of people who break social norms are judged as less causal rather than more.

Once you have created a causal model of a scenario, you can save it for future use:

And that’s it!

Currently the app implements two different computational models: the Counterfactual Effect Size (CES) and the Necessity-Sufficiency model (Quillien & Lucas, 2024; Icard, Kominsky, and Knobe, 2017). There are other models of causal judgment out there, and they might be implemented in a future version.

You can read more about the R package (which powers the app) here. The app is easiest to use, but for research purposes ultimately the R package offers more flexibility. For more background on the computational models themselves you can read the relevant papers (see References).

Hopefully this tool allows more people to contribute to the new wave of research on causation inspired by computational models. If you have questions about the app or the package I’m very happy to answer them either in the comments or by email.

Literature

Icard, Thomas, Jonathan Kominsky, and Joshua Knobe (2017): “Normality and Actual Causal Strength,” Cognition 161, 80–93. (Link)

Quillien, Tadeg, and and Christopher Lucas(2024): “Counterfactuals and the Logic of Causal Selection,” Psychological Review 131 (5), 1208–1234. (Link)

Quillien, Tadeg (2026): causaljudgment: Computational Models of Causal Judgment, R package version 0.1.0. (Link)

Survey: Philosophers’ Views on Exploitation

Posted on October 5, 2026October 5, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Benjamin Ferguson, Peter Matthews, David Ronayne, and Roberto Veneziani are inviting academic philosophers to take part in a short online survey on exploitation. Participants will evaluate various abstract scenarios, and the survey takes roughly ten minutes to complete.

The announcement reads:

We are conducting a survey about academic philosophers’ views of (1) the effect of exploitation on subjective wellbeing, (2) how morally wrong exploitative relations are, and (3) norms around that wrongfulness, by asking you to evaluate various abstract scenarios.

It takes roughly 10 minutes to complete the questions, with the option to answer more if you like. If you complete the survey, we will enter you in our prize draw to receive one of ten $100 (or local currency equivalent) Amazon vouchers (unless you opt out).

Click here to take our survey (if you are using a VPN, please disconnect it before answering or we cannot use your responses):

https://esmt.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1TaQ6Qm8zeIrfuK

Thank you for contributing your expertise!

We have been granted ethical approval by review committees at our institutions.

We are Benjamin Ferguson (Warwick), Peter Matthews (Middlebury), David Ronayne (ESMT Berlin), and Roberto Veneziani (Queen Mary University London).

Call: “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy”

Posted on October 5, 2026October 5, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

In March 2027, the first “Complutense Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy” will take place at the Facultad de Filosofía of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain, with keynotes by María José Frápolli Sanz and James Andow.

Abstracts can be submitted until November 1, 2026. The call reads:

Submission deadline: 1 November 2026

Notification of acceptance: 15 December 2026

Conference date(s): March 2027

Workshop Venue: Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain.

Details

Intuitions are a source of evidence that many people use to a greater or lesser extent. We rely on them to investigate a wide variety of issues, for example, moral, mathematical, or religious questions, or to examine other people’s opinions on a host of different topics. Although there is debate about what is an intuition, appealing to intuitions has been one of the most widely used methods in many areas within analytic philosophy. The accepted view (see Goldman, 2007; Weinberg, 2007; Williamson, 2007, p. 2; Baz, 2012, p. 87; Koopman, 2012; Kornblith, 2014) is that intuitions play a fundamental evidential role.

Besides, there has been a dispute within analytic philosophy between three different groups of philosophers during the last decades. First, the “autonomists” (see, e.g., Bealer, 1998; Liao, 2008; Sosa, 2013; Chalmers, 2014; Devitt, 2015) defend that introspection and appeal to intuition can be used to answer many philosophical questions. Second, those who defend that analytic philosophers do not employ intuitions as evidence in philosophical practice. Following Nado (2016, p. 782), we can call them “intuition deniers” (see, e.g., Williamson, 2007; Deustch, 2009; Cappelen, 2012). Third, those who think that analytic philosophers use intuitions as evidence but doubt this method, arguing instead for the need to apply more rigorous methods drawn from scientific disciplines such as psychology, the social sciences, or linguistics; we can call them “experimental philosophers” (see, for example, Machery et al., 2004; Knobe and Nichols, 2007; Mallon et al., 2009; Alexander et al., 2010).

This workshop aims to include presentations addressing the relationship between intuitions and experimental philosophy. The presentations accepted are expected to develop novel perspectives or adopt novel approaches that shed light on traditional problems associated with intuitions in analytic philosophy. Both experimental and theoretical papers will be accepted, as well as explicit defenses of any of the above positions, papers that point out desiderata that all three should fulfill, or papers dealing with other issues related to intuitions and experimental philosophy.

Some possible topics that presentations may address are:

  • Intuitions and mental experiments.
  • Conflicting intuitions in questionnaires.
  • Intuitions and justification.
  • Calibration of intuitions.
  • Differences in the use of intuitions in different areas of analytic philosophy.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of the role of intuition talk in the arguments of analytic philosophers.
  • Empirical or theoretical analyses of philosophical practices making use of intuitions.
  • Using intuition in conceptual engineering.

Submission

Please submit an abstract including:

  • Title of the paper.
  • Abstract (400–500 words) clearly presenting the research question, theoretical framework, and main argument (in English or Spanish).
  • Institutional affiliation.

The deadline for submitting abstracts is 1 November 2026. Abstracts must be anonymized (also anonymize self-citations) and must have a section including the bibliographic references (not included in the word count). Abstracts should be sent to the following email: davbordo@ucm.es, specifying the following subject: 1st Workshop on Intuitions and Experimental Philosophy.

For any questions, please write to davbordo@ucm.es.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

María José Frápolli Sanz (Universidad de Granada, Spain; Institute of Philosophy. School of Advance Study, University of London, United Kingdom).

James Andow (University of Manchester, United Kingdom).

Organizers

David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).

Martín Capece del Toro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain).

Scientific Committee

Asier Arias Domínguez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Filippo Batisti (), Antonio Blanco Salgueiro (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), David Bordonaba-Plou (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Esteban Céspedes (Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Valparaíso, Chile), Antonio Duarte Calvo (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), María Dolores García Arnaldos (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Krzysztof Sękowski (University of Warsaw, Poland).

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Recent Posts

  • Workshop: “XPHI UK Work in Progress Workshop Series”
  • Job: “Shining Light on Praise” and “The Social Power of Praise” (Zurich, Switzerland)
  • Job: “CONCEPHEX” (Seville, Spain)
  • Job: “Careful, Now!” (Nuremberg, Germany)
  • Survey: “Dualist And Physicalist Minds”

Recent Comments

  1. Paul Henne on A New R Package and Interactive App for Computational Models of Causal JudgmentOctober 13, 2026

    Thank you for this contribution, Tadeg! I'm looking forward to seeing how future researchers will use this

  2. Joanna Demaree-Cotton on Where Should I Publish My X-Phi? A New ResourceApril 24, 2026

    Thanks for the comment, that's really useful. We'll definitely add AJP (missed you accidentally first time!), and that note.

  3. AJP Editor on Where Should I Publish My X-Phi? A New ResourceApril 24, 2026

    AJP is published by Taylor & Francis, and we have an member of the editorial team ('associate editor' in our…

  4. Nova Praxis on The Folk Concept of ArtJuly 11, 2025

    This article highlights an important point: everyday people don’t rely on rigid definitions to determine what qualifies as art. They’re…

  5. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 27, 2025

    That is indeed exactly the question I have as well. I operationalize it as having de facto contradicting intuitions, in…

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