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Category: Epistemology

Call: “Artificial Life as Experimental Philosophy”

Posted on April 4, 2026April 4, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

Ben Gaskin and Simon McGregor organize a special session of The 2026 Artificial Life Conference titled “Artificial Life as Experimental Philosophy,” which will take place in Waterloo, Canada, from August 17 to 21, 2026.

Papers can be submitted until March 30, 2026. The call reads:

ALife has always had a markedly philosophical character – a fact not unnoticed by some philosophers. Daniel Dennett, for instance, saw in ALife the creation of testable thought experiments – in simulating a thing, you render explicit your assumptions. Despite this clear affinity, however, the engagement he foresaw has not materialised.

This is not for ALife’s lack of interest in or relevance to traditionally philosophical content, but perhaps rather for its practicing an alternate philosophy in which the reflexive relationship between pragmatic and theoretical is constitutive. Here philosophy and science are united, with thought in turn structuring and being structured by experimental practice. In this respect, ALife may be closer to the original tradition of natural philosophy than philosophy in its more modern disciplinary forms.

This session invites broad reflection on the nature of this relationship between philosophy and artificial life. What role do computational experiments play in philosophical inquiry – and what role should they? How does ALife address questions that philosophy also claims – agency, autonomy, emergence, individuality – and how does its treatment differ? The conference theme itself poses one such question: what is life, and what does it mean to be life-like?

Call for Papers

We welcome both experimental work whose philosophical motivations or implications are brought to the fore, and philosophical or theoretical work that engages directly with ALife methods and results. We are as interested in what can be said in principle as in what your work specifically reveals – and especially in work that does not sit neatly in either of these.

Questions of Interest

Questions we are interested in include:

  • What are we doing when we simulate a thing?
  • Where is emergence when it happens in a machine – how do silicon and simulations reshape the question of emergence?
  • What is the relationship in simulations between form, function, parameters, and dynamics?
  • If the rules are made up, what do they teach us – how do we reconcile tunability with the language of findings?
  • What are the laws of motion of living matter, and how does ALife relate to theoretical biology?
  • Is life just physics, or is there something more – what can ALife tell us about the relationship between vitalism and mechanism?
  • What is ALife’s precedent, what does it inherit, and how does it differ – from the automata of Hero to the gavra of Rava to Jābir’s takwīn?
  • Could artificial life ever really be alive – and if so, what are the implications?
  • How does wet ALife relate to these questions – does it change what counts as artificial, as alive, or both?

These are examples, not boundaries – we welcome any work that engages with the philosophical dimensions of artificial life. Contributions from across ALife, philosophy, history and philosophy of science, and related fields are encouraged.

Submissions

Papers should be 3–8 pages in ALIFE format. We welcome experimental, theoretical, and position papers. Accepted papers will be published in the ALIFE 2026 proceedings (MIT Press). The conference is hybrid – presentations can be given in person or online. Please select the “Artificial Life as Experimental Philosophy” special session when submitting. For full formatting guidelines, see the ALIFE 2026 Call for Papers.

Conference: “Social Ontology and Empirical Inquiry”

Posted on April 4, 2026April 4, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

From April 11 to 12, 2026, the conference “Social Ontology and Empirical Inquiry – Conflicts and Connections” will take place at the University of Pittsburgh. The conference page reads:

We are pleased to announce a two-day interdisciplinary workshop hosted by the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, focusing on the intersection of social metaphysics and empirical research in the social sciences.

The workshop aims to foster dialogue between philosophers and social scientists who are interested in the nature of social reality and in how conceptual and empirical approaches to understanding it can be fruitfully integrated.

Social scientists and philosophers have long sought to clarify what it means for entities such as races, genders, institutions, and social structures to exist and to act. Meanwhile, empirically-oriented social scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated methods for measuring, modeling, and explaining such phenomena. This workshop will bring these conversations together to explore the conflicts and connections between conceptual–theoretical frameworks and empirical–methodological practices in the study of the social world.

Organizing Committee

  • Kareem Khalifa, UCLA
  • Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh
  • Mark Risjord, Emory
  • David Thorstad, Vanderbilt

Confirmed Keynotes

The program will include keynote talks and panels by both philosophers and social scientists, including scholars such as:

  • Petri Ylikoski (University of Helsinki)
  • Brian Epstein (Tufts University)
  • Aliya Saperstein (Stanford University)
  • Issa Kohler-Hausmann (Yale Law School)

Guiding Questions

  • What kinds of things are social entities – individuals, groups, institutions, norms, and categories such as race and gender?
  • How can such entities be both socially constructed and real?
  • What is the relationship between social ontology and social measurement?
  • How should metaphysical theories about the nature of the social world inform, or be informed by, empirical research designs?
  • Do social explanations involve forms of causation, mechanism, or structure that differ from those in the natural sciences?
  • How can philosophical analysis of social kinds enrich empirical debates about classification, comparability, and operationalization?

Format

The workshop will include:

  • 30-minute contributed presentations (20 minutes presentation + 10 minutes Q&A)
  • Keynote lectures by invited speakers
  • A roundtable discussion on future directions in social ontology and empirical research

Talk: “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” (Véronique Izard)

Posted on March 19, 2026March 19, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

As part of the IHPST’s Séminaire PhilSciCog at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Véronique Izard will talk about “Cognitive Foundations of Geometry” on March 26, 2026, from 02:00–03:30 (UTC). The hybrid session can be accessed via Zoom (Meeting ID: 950 6108 6376, Code: 535047). The abstract reads:

From the first months of life, young children can perceive numeric quantities and perform additive or multiplicative operations on quantities. These abilities support the acquisition of number concepts later in life, and have been proposed to enable humans’ arithmetic cognition. What about geometry, another major branch of mathematics? In this talk, I will present two recent studies assessing the scope and the limits of human geometric intuition. The first study focused on Euclidean geometry, and found that children and adults encode a rich repertoire of geometric properties, at several levels of abstraction. The second study probed intuitions for non-Euclidean geometry and revealed the existence of a pervasive Euclidean bias in adults, identifying limits to the flexibility of human geometric intuition.

Call: “Folk Epistemology and Science Skepticism”

Posted on March 8, 2026March 8, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

From August 10 to 14, 2026, the Cologne Summer School will take place at the University of Cologne. This year’s topic will be “Folk Epistemology and Science Skepticism,” with special guest Mikkel Gerken.

Proposals for brief presentations on Gerken’s work can be submitted until April 15, 2026. The call reads:

The Cologne Summer School is an annual, week-long, event at which leading epistemologists present their current work in a series of lectures, defend their views against critical comments, and discuss their work with participants. The Summer School mainly aims at professional philosophers and graduate students, but anyone is welcome to apply. In 2026 our special guest will be Mikkel Gerken (University of Southern Denmark).

Gerken works in epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. In Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental (Palgrave 2013), Gerken considers how externalism in philosophy of mind bears on the nature of the epistemology of inference. In On Folk Epistemology (OUP 2017), he argues that folk epistemological heuristics explain patterns of intuitive judgments that have mistakenly been taken to motivate epistemic contextualism, pragmatic encroachment, and knowledge-first epistemology. Doing so involves engagement with cognitive psychology as well as methodological considerations about the relationship between folk epistemological intuitions and epistemological theorizing. In Scientific Testimony (OUP 2022), Gerken argues that testimony is a vital part of science and articulates epistemic norms governing it. Furthermore, he considers scientific testimony to the lay public and empirically informed science communication strategies for addressing science skepticism. In addition to the monographs, Gerken has published on epistemic injustice, epistemic norms of action and assertion, transcendental arguments, the necessary a posteriori, philosophical skepticism, philosophical methodology etc.

Cologne Summer School Themes: The 2026 Summer School will address a range of issues from foundational to applied social epistemology. Many of the discussions will revolve around an important real-life problem – namely, science skepticism. For example, we will examine how science skepticism is related to varieties of philosophical skepticism. Furthermore, we will consider how folk epistemological heuristics and conversational norms may fuel public skepticism about science. We will also consider ways in which epistemologists and philosophers of science may play a role in combating science skepticism. Thus, some of the discussions overlap with issues in philosophy of science. Throughout, there will be an emphasis on philosophical methodology and epistemology’s relationship to empirical research in the social and cognitive sciences.

Topics will include

  • Philosophical skepticism and real-life (science) skepticism
  • Folk epistemology and its relation to epistemology
  • Epistemic norms of assertion and science communication
  • Internalism and externalism in epistemology and mind
  • Intuitive judgments and philosophical methodology
  • The epistemic roles of science in society

The Summer School is free but limited to 50 participants. Online application is possible through April 15. Please supply a short letter that sketches your academic background and main motivation for participating in the Summer School. If you are interested in giving a brief presentation (approx. 20 minutes) related to Gerken’s work, please also send an abstract of no more than 1,000 words.

Apply via email to:
summerschoolphilosophy@uni-koeln.de

Call: “Theory and Practice After the Practice Turn”

Posted on January 10, 2026January 10, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

On April 17, 2026, the Research Center Normative Orders at Goethe University Frankfurt will host an online workshop titled “Theory and Practice After the Practice Turn – Where Social Theory and Empirical Philosophy Meet.”

Proposals for contributions can be submitted until February 14. The call reads:

Sociology and philosophy have always shared a close relationship. Critical Theory famously tied the two disciplines together to unravel societal phenomena, and feminist philosophers regularly borrow sociological concepts to understand domination and power asymmetries. Similarly, sociologists often draw on philosophical concepts to sharpen their analyses. In recent years, this dialogue has gained new momentum through the so-called “practice turn” in epistemology and philosophy of science. Contemporary philosophy of science and applied epistemology increasingly incorporate empirical methods originally developed within the social sciences such as interviews and ethnographic studies. But while empirical approaches from sociology are frequently adopted, social-theoretical concepts remain rarely integrated within epistemology and philosophy of science.

It is the goal of this workshop to explore the potential of social theory for empirical approaches in philosophy of science and epistemology. What are instances of fruitful applications of social theory to philosophy of science and epistemological scholarship? How does social theory transform when it is resituated in a different disciplinary setting? What are caveats and best practices when using social theory as a philosopher of science/epistemologist?

We are looking for workshop contributions that are focused on but not limited to:

  • Examples of using social theory along with empirical methods in philosophy of science and
    epistemology.
  • Reflections on methodological and conceptual challenges when transferring social-theoretical
    concepts into philosophical work.

Workshop contributions will also be considered for publication in a special issue (target journal: Synthese) on social theory in empirical philosophy of science & epistemology.

Send submissions to: sophie.juliane.veigl@univie.ac.at; riegler@em.uni-frankfurt.de

Hot Off The Press: “Health and Disease”

Posted on January 10, 2026January 10, 2026 by Alexander Max Bauer

With “Health and Disease,” Somogy Varga, Andrew James Latham, and Edouard Machery deliver a deep dive into Experimental Philosophy of Medicine. The summary reads:

The concepts of health and disease are fundamental to medical research, healthcare, and public health, and philosophers have long sought to clarify their meaning and implications. Increasingly, it is suggested that progress in this area could be advanced by integrating empirical methods with philosophical reflection. This Element explores the emerging field of experimental philosophy of medicine (XPhiMed), which takes this approach by applying empirical methods to longstanding philosophical debates. It begins with an overview of the philosophical debates and their methodological challenges, followed by an exploration of experimental findings on health, disease, and disorder, along with their implications for philosophy and other fields.

Job: “Experimental argument analysis” (Norwich, UK)

Posted on October 27, 2025October 27, 2025 by Alexander Max Bauer

The University of East Anglia is hiring a Research Associate to work from January 8 to June 30, 2026, on a research project in experimental philosophy.

Applications are possible until November 25. The job announcement reads:

Salary on appointment will be £31,236 per annum (pro rata), with an annual increment up to 37,694 per annum (pro rata).

An exciting opportunity has arisen for a Research Associate join the School of Psychology to conduct studies in experimental philosophy, as part of the research project “Experimental argument analysis: Reasoning with stereotypes” which is hosted by the UEA Experimental Philosophy Group.

As a Research Associate you will contribute to the research programme, analyse and interpret data, write up results and present information on research progress and outcomes.

You will have a graduate level qualification, equivalent qualification or experience and be able to work in a proactive and results driven manner in a high paced environment. You will also have strong interpersonal and communication skills, the ability to analyse and interpret data and work effectively as part of a team. Advanced skills directly relating to this research area and previous research experience would be advantageous.

This part-time (0.9 FTE) post is available from 8 January 2026 on a fixed-term basis until 30 June 2026.

UEA offers a variety of flexible working options and we encourage applications from individuals who would prefer a flexible working pattern including annualised hours, compressed working hours, part time, job share, term-time only and/or hybrid working. Details of preferred hours should be stated in the personal statement and will be discussed further at interview.

Benefits include:

  • 44 days annual leave inclusive of Bank Holidays and University Customary days (pro rata for part-time).
  • Family and Work-life balance policies including hybrid working and considerable maternity, paternity, shared parental leave and adoption leave.
  • Generous pension scheme with life cover for dependants, plus incapacity cover.
  • Health and Wellbeing: discounted access to Sportspark facilities, relaxation rooms, 320 acres of rolling parkland, wellbeing walks, Wellbeing Ambassador network, on-campus medical centre including NHS Dentist, Occupational Health and a 24/7 Employee Assistance Programme.
  • Campus Facilities: Sportspark, library, nursery, supermarket, post office, bars and catering outlets.
  • Exclusive shopping discounts to help cut the cost of household bills, childcare salary sacrifice scheme, Cycle to Work scheme and public transport discounts.
  • Personal Development: unlimited access to LinkedIn Learning courses, specialist advice and training from our Organisational Development and Professional Learning Team.

Closing date: 25 November 2025

The University holds an Athena Swan Silver Institutional Award in recognition of our advancement towards gender equality.

Further Information

For further information, including the Job Description and Person Specification, please see the attached Candidate Brochure.

For an informal discussion about the post please contact the PI, Professor Eugen Fischer via e.fischer@uea.ac.uk

Call: “Folk Epistemology”

Posted on August 26, 2025August 26, 2025 by Alexander Max Bauer

Mirko Farina, Artur Karimov, Anna Sakharova, Mikhail Khort, Daniel Lavrishchev, Vladislav Stasenko, and Natalia Khairullina are organizing a conference on “Folk Epistemology – Exploring Everyday Conceptions of Knowledge,” which will take place at the Kazan Federal University from October 24 to 25. The conference will be hybrid, featuring a dedicated online section in English.

Abstracts for presentations can be submitted until October 10. The call reads:

What is knowledge? Philosophers have long sought answers to this fundamental question within the confines of their studies. Yet contemporary epistemology faces a profound challenge: How universal and adequate are the intuitions underlying theories derived from “armchair” conceptual analysis? This challenge has emerged alongside intensive research into folk epistemology – the study of ordinary people’s conceptions of knowledge, truth, justification, reliability, and other epistemic categories. Data from experimental philosophy (x-phi) reveal that what seems obvious and universal to the armchair philosopher may vary significantly across cultural, social, linguistic, or educational contexts. Does this call into question the possibility of a unified theory of knowledge? Are folk intuitions a reliable test for the adequacy of philosophical concepts their inevitable foundation (as x-phi advocates argue) – or merely “empirical noise” unrelated to epistemology’s inherently normative aims?

Conference Goals

This conference aims to create a platform for critical and constructive discussion on the role of folk epistemic conceptions and intuitions in modern philosophy. Participants are invited to address the following key questions:

  • Conceptualizing Folk Epistemology: What are its boundaries? How is it manifested in language (epistemic modalities, knowledge verbs), social and cognitive practices (distribution of epistemic authority, source credibility, non-expert assessments of justification reliability)? How can we account for pragmatic and moral “encroachments” in knowledge descriptions?
  • Relevance of Folk Conceptions for Philosophical Theory: Should epistemological theories explicitly incorporate, refute, or methodologically disregard data on folk conceptions? What are their heuristic values and limitations?
  • Critical Analysis of X-Phi Methodology in Epistemology: How can empirical data enrich philosophical reflection? What are the limitations of experimental approaches in clarifying normative questions? How does variability in intuitions impact debates about epistemic universalism, contextualism, or relativism?
  • Applied Potential of X-Phi Data: How can research on folk epistemology (especially cross-cultural variations in epistemic conceptions) inform practical applications? How might this data improve AI systems (e.g., model training, dialogue agent design) and optimize human-AI interaction (e.g., fostering epistemic trust in intelligent assistants)?

Call for Interdisciplinary Dialogue

We aim to transcend disciplinary boundaries and welcome contributions from all scholars engaged in folk epistemology research. In addition to papers on the above themes, we particularly encourage:

  • Presentations of empirical/experimental studies on epistemic conceptions and intuitions by philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists.
  • Proposals for planned empirical research (experiments, surveys, linguistic analyses, etc.), including hypotheses, designs, and methodologies.

This segment will foster discussion on methodological challenges, brainstorming for refining x-phi tools, and exploring collaborative opportunities.

Submission Guidelines

To participate, please:

  • Complete the registration form: https://forms.gle/rCu72uaTJwc8GQZx6
  • Include your full name, contact email, presentation title, and abstract (100–250 words).
  • If you have any difficulties filling out this form or have any questions about the conference, please contact mikhort@gmail.com (Mikhail Khort).

Deadline: October 10, 2025.

Updates & Information

The conference schedule, detailed announcements, and additional information will be available via: Telegram Channel: https://t.me/kznphil

Call: “Moral Epistemology and Social Progress”

Posted on August 26, 2025August 26, 2025 by Alexander Max Bauer

Antonio Gaitán Torres and Hugo Viciana organize a workshop on “Moral Epistemology and Social Progress – Experimental and Philosophical Perspectives,” which will take place at the Universidad de Sevilla from November 4 to 5.

Abstracts for presentations can be submitted until September 17. The call reads:

This focused workshop explores the intersection of empirical research on moral cognition and philosophical theories of social and moral progress. We bring together experimental philosophers and moral epistemologists to examine how empirical findings about moral intuitions, attitude change, and intellectual virtues inform our understanding of moral improvement at both individual and societal levels. The workshop features invited speakers alongside selected contributions from an open call for abstracts, fostering intimate discussion among researchers working at the forefront of experimental and theoretical approaches to moral progress. Submissions addressing experimental studies of moral judgment, philosophical accounts of moral progress, or the epistemology of moral improvement are particularly welcome.

We welcome submissions for 3–4 additional presentations at this workshop. Interested researchers should submit an abstract of 350–750 words addressing topics at the intersection of moral epistemology, experimental philosophy, and social progress. Abstracts might explore empirical studies of moral cognition, philosophical theories of moral improvement, experimental metaethics, intellectual virtues, the psychology of moral change, or related themes in moral epistemology. Please send your abstract to both hviciana@us.es and agaitan@hum.uc3m.es with the subject line “November Workshop.” The deadline for submissions is 17 September 2025. Selected presenters will have approximately 30 minutes for their presentation followed by discussion.

Job: “PhD Scholarships in Neurophilosophy” (Munich, Germany)

Posted on January 7, 2025October 27, 2025 by Alexander Max Bauer

The Graduate School of Systemic Neuroscience (GSN) at the University of Munich offers PhD scholarships in neurophilosophy.

Applications are possible until November 25. The job announcement reads:

PhD scholarship at GSN

You can apply for a neurophilosophy PhD scholarship in an annually recurring call for scholarships (application period from early December to mid-February). The GSN offers a structured doctoral program with an independent PhD (GSN Doctoral Program), in which you can choose from a wide range of interdisciplinary courses together with your TAC (Thesis Advisory Board) to put together an interdisciplinary study program tailored to your individual research interests. This gives you a sound neuroscientific insight into the (natural) scientific contexts that are important for your neurophilosophical doctoral project. In addition, there is an extensive range of “soft skills” and an attractive social program.

Call for PhD scholarships in Neurophilosophy

The application round for 2024/25 is now open and will close on 17 February 2025 (12:00 noon CET).

The Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences (GSN) at LMU Munich invites applications for several PhD scholarships in Neurophilosophy. The GSN is the teaching entity for the Munich Center of Neurosciences – Brain & Mind (MCN). By creating an interdisciplinary network of research, the GSN provides a stimulating environment for students and faculty to produce novel formulations of current concepts and theories. Successful applicants will be affiliated with the Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neurosciences at the GSN.

Projects in the research center fall in the following areas:

  • philosophy of cognitive neuroscience (explanation, reduction)
  • philosophy and cognitive science of agency (mental causation, free will, moral psychology, abilities)
  • philosophy and cognitive science of reasoning (e.g. deductive and non-deductive reasoning, logic and neural networks, decision making)
  • ethics of neuroscience (research ethics, enhancement)
  • philosophy of perception
  • philosophy and social cognition

In the new application round we encourage applications in smaller focus areas in order to build research groups. In the 2024/25 round the focus areas are:

  • human agency (esp. mental causation, complex action, multi-tasking, attention, reductive and non-reductive explanation of agency)
  • metacognition (esp. metacognition in perception, self-evaluation and sense of self)
  • group cognition (group epistemology, collective decisions and group responsibility)

However, single exceptional and independent projects in one of the other areas are also encouraged.

Applicants should have advanced training in philosophy (typically a Master’s degree in philosophy) and a genuine interest in the neurosciences. This includes the willingness to acquire substantial knowledge of empirical work relevant to their philosophical project. Cooperative projects with empirical scientists in the network of the MCN are strongly encouraged.

The application period will open on 1 December 2024 and will close on 17 February 2025 (12:00 noon CET). Please check our website and the GSN website for details concerning the application procedure. The application includes an outline of your proposed research project, a CV, an official transcript of your academic work (list of attended courses; grades), diplomas and two separate academic reference letters. Please also name two potential supervisors (possibly including one non-philosopher) from the core or affiliated neurophilosophy faculty of the GSN.

How to apply for a GSN PhD scholarship

Please follow the standard application process for GSN PhD applications:

  • Details of the process and application form

In addition to the application form, please submit a short exposé (max. 3000 words) that

  • gives an outline of your main project
  • explains how your project fits with the focus topic or one of the other topics listed in the call for applications
  • names two or three potential supervisors (at least two in the GSN faculty)
  • sketches an interdisciplinary cooperation project (an empirical study that relates to your theoretical work)
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Recent Posts

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  • Call: “Measuring the Mind”

Recent Comments

  1. Nova Praxis on The Folk Concept of ArtJuly 11, 2025

    This article highlights an important point: everyday people don’t rely on rigid definitions to determine what qualifies as art. They’re…

  2. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 27, 2025

    That is indeed exactly the question I have as well. I operationalize it as having de facto contradicting intuitions, in…

  3. Joshua Knobe on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 24, 2025

    Hi Koen, Thanks once again. This idea brings up all sorts of fascinating questions, but for the purposes of the…

  4. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 24, 2025

    Great! In the meantime I thought of another potentially interesting example of framing—Arnold Kling’s Three Languages of Politics. Just about…

  5. Joshua Knobe on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 23, 2025

    Thanks Koen! This is all super helpful.

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