The Experimental Philosophy Blog

Philosophy Meets Empirical Research

Menu
  • Home
  • About
  • Guidelines for Comments
  • Labs and Organizations
  • Resources
Menu

Talk: “Philosophical Arguments Can Boost Charitable Giving” (Eric Schwitzgebel and Kirstan Brodie)

Posted on October 25, 2025October 25, 2025 by Alexander Max Bauer

On Thursday, October 30, the first talk in the Experimental Philosophy Journal Series will take place on Zoom.

Celso de Oliveira Vieira, Alex Wiegmann, and Rodrigo Díaz write:

We are pleased to invite you to the first talk in the Experimental Philosophy Journal Series, the new journal dedicated to X-Phi.

In this session, Eric Schwitzgebel (California) and Kirstan Brodie (Cornell) will present their paper, “Philosophical arguments can boost charitable giving,” co-authored with Nemirow and Cushman. The preprint, in which the authors identify the elements of a range of philosophical arguments that boost charitable giving, is available here. The presentation will be followed by a commentary from Rodrigo Díaz (CSIC). He wrote “Do Moral Beliefs Motivate Action?,” accessible here. After that, the floor will be open for discussion. The authors will speak first, but the audience will be able to participate as well.

The session will take place online on October 30th at 10 AM PDT/6 PM CET.
Here is the Zoom link: http://tiny.cc/xphij1
For inquiries, please contact Celso Vieira at celso.deoliveiravieira@rub.de.

See you soon,
Celso, Alex, and Rodrigo

Tags: Giving Behaviour
Category: AnnouncementsEthics and Morals

Post navigation

← Call: “The Fifth Annual Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop”
Job: “Experimental argument analysis” (Norwich, UK) →

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *


Search

Categories

Tags

Agency Artificial Intelligence Basic Needs Behavior Beliefs Bias Bioethics Blame Causation Cognitive Science Consciousness Corpus Analysis Cross-Cultural Research Decisions Determinism Distributive Justice Emotions Essentialism Expertise Folk Morality Framing Free Will Gender Intention Intuition Jurisprudence Knowledge Large Language Models Norms Objectivism Pejoratives Problem of Evil Psycholinguistics Rationality Reasoning Replication Responsibility Self Side-Effect Effect Slurs Truth Valence Values Virtue Well-Being

Recent Posts

  • Job: “Experimental argument analysis” (Norwich, UK)
  • Talk: “Philosophical Arguments Can Boost Charitable Giving” (Eric Schwitzgebel and Kirstan Brodie)
  • Call: “The Fifth Annual Formal and Experimental Philosophy Workshop”
  • Call: “Valence Asymmetries”
  • Hot Off The Press: “Empirical Studies on Questions of Need-Based Distributive Justice”

Recent Comments

  1. Nova Praxis on The Folk Concept of ArtJuly 11, 2025

    This article highlights an important point: everyday people don’t rely on rigid definitions to determine what qualifies as art. They’re…

  2. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 27, 2025

    That is indeed exactly the question I have as well. I operationalize it as having de facto contradicting intuitions, in…

  3. Joshua Knobe on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 24, 2025

    Hi Koen, Thanks once again. This idea brings up all sorts of fascinating questions, but for the purposes of the…

  4. Koen Smets on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 24, 2025

    Great! In the meantime I thought of another potentially interesting example of framing—Arnold Kling’s Three Languages of Politics. Just about…

  5. Joshua Knobe on Priming Effects Are Fake, but Framing Effects Are RealMay 23, 2025

    Thanks Koen! This is all super helpful.

Archives

  • October 2025
  • September 2025
  • August 2025
  • July 2025
  • June 2025
  • May 2025
  • April 2025
  • March 2025
  • February 2025
  • January 2025
  • December 2024
  • November 2024
  • October 2024
  • September 2024
  • August 2024
  • July 2024
  • June 2024
  • May 2024
  • April 2024
  • March 2024

Meta

  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.org

Imprint • Disclaimer • Privacy Statement • Cookie Policy

© 2024 The Experimental Philosophy Blog
Manage Consent
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes. The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
  • Manage options
  • Manage services
  • Manage {vendor_count} vendors
  • Read more about these purposes
View Preferences
  • {title}
  • {title}
  • {title}